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Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and 
Organizing in an Era of Political Inequality 
abstract.  This Article proposes an innovative approach to remedying the crisis of political 
inequality: using law to facilitate organizing by the poor and working class, not only as workers, 
but also as tenants, debtors, welfare beneficiaries, and others. The piece draws on the social-move-
ments literature, and the successes and failures of labor law, to show how law can supplement the 
deficient regimes of campaign finance and lobbying reform and enable lower-income groups to 
build organizations capable of countervailing the political power of the wealthy. As such, the Arti-
cle offers a new direction forward for the public-law literature on political power and political 
inequality. It also offers critical lessons for government officials, organizers, and advocates seeking 
to respond to the inequalities made painfully evident by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
authors. Kate Andrias is Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Benjamin I. 
Sachs is Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry, Harvard Law School. For helpful comments 
and discussion, the authors thank Sharon Block, Catherine Fisk, Daryl Levinson, Nina Mendelson, 
Bill Novak, David Pozen, Richard Primus, K. Sabeel Rahman, Ganesh Sitaraman, and participants 
at workshops at Columbia Law School, Michigan Law School, Michigan State Law School, Tel 
Aviv Law School, University of Wisconsin Law School, and Wayne State Law School. The authors 
also thank Harry Graver, Courtney Brunson, Ciara Davis, Jonathan Edelman, Annie Hollister, 
Donya Khadem, Jonathan Levitan, Rebecca Moonitz, Jared Odessky, Elizabeth Rodgers, Rachel 
Sandalow-Ash, Owen Senders, and Zachary Simon for excellent research assistance. Finally, the 

















i. inequality, democracy, and countervailing organizations 562 
A. The Unequal Landscape of Political Organization 562 
B. Political Inequality in a Democratic Republic 569 
C. Extant Approaches to Using Law to Combat Political Inequality 573 
ii. urgency and promise of a law of organizing 577 
iii. factors and facilitators 586 
A. Framing 587 
B. Resources 595 
1. Funding 599 
a. Charitable Donations: Limits and Pitfalls 599 
b. Self-Funding Facilitated by Law 602 
c. Cost-Shi�ing 605 
d. State Subsidies 606 
2. Physical and Virtual Spaces 608 
3. Information 610 
4. Human Resources 612 
C. Free Spaces 613 
D. Removing Barriers to Participation 620 
E. Material Changes, Incremental Victories, and Structural Power 623 












the yale law journal 130:546  2021 
548 
introduction 
Among the painful truths made evident by COVID-19 are the deep inequal-
ity of American society and the profound inadequacy of our social-welfare infra-
structure. The nation’s lack of comprehensive health care,1 its underfunded and 
inefficient system of unemployment insurance,2 and weak workplace safety and 
health guarantees,3 along with nearly nonexistent paid sick leave,4 debtor-for-
giveness rules,5 and tenant protections6 leave poor and working-class commu-
nities—particularly communities of color—dangerously exposed to the ravages 
of this pandemic, both physical and economic.7 America’s weak social safety net 
is, in turn, a product of a profound failure that has plagued American democracy 
for decades now: the wealthy exercising vastly disproportionate power over pol-
itics and government.8 
 
1. See Aaron van Dorn, Rebecca E. Cooney & Miriam L. Sabin, COVID-19 Exacerbating Inequal-
ities in the US, 395 LANCET 1243, 1243-44 (2020). 
2. See Kathryn A. Edwards, Millions Need Unemployment Benefits. Unfortunately, the Delivery Sys-
tem Is Broken, RAND BLOG (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/millions-
need-unemployment-benefits-unfortunately-the.html [https://perma.cc/7566-3WHA]. 
3. See Emily Schwing, How OSHA Has Failed to Protect America’s Workers from COVID-19, RE-
VEAL (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.revealnews.org/article/how-osha-has-failed-to-protect-
americas-workers-from-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/C3P5-454A]. 
4. See 179 Countries Have Paid Sick Leave. Not the US, WORLD (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:30 PM EDT), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-03-13/179-countries-have-paid-sick-leave-not-us 
[https://perma.cc/FP5J-7C4K]. 
5. See Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, If You Want a Quick Recovery, Forgive Debts, BARRON’S 
(Apr. 15, 2020, 1:14 PM EDT), https://www.barrons.com/articles/if-you-want-a-quick-re-
covery-forgive-debts-51586969309 [https://perma.cc/T99X-99T6]. 
6. See Dan Keating & Lauren Tierney, Which States Are Doing a Better Job Protecting Renters from 
Being Evicted During the Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/04/29/which-states-are-doing-better-job-
protecting-renters-being-evicted-during-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/BJ7H-
SSCM]; COVID-19 Housing Policy Scorecard, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/covid-
policy-scorecard [https://perma.cc/8WHW-4AA8]. 
7. See Matt Apuzzo & Monika Pronczuk, COVID-19’s Economic Pain Is Universal. But Relief? De-
pends on Where You Live, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/03/23/world/europe/coronavirus-economic-relief-wages.html [https:
//perma.cc/8VYU-LC87]; Chris McGreal, The Inequality Virus: How the Pandemic Hit Amer-
ica’s Poorest, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2020, 2:09 PM EDT), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2020/apr/09/america-inequality-laid-bare-coronavirus 
[https://perma.cc/35Q2-RXPC]. 
8. Even in the midst of the pandemic, as unemployment soared and poor and working-class 
Americans suffered enormous financial pain, the power of the wealthy was manifest in the 
relief bills that emerged from Washington. For example, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
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Indeed, public faith in American democracy is at near-record lows, and in-
creasing numbers of Americans report that they no longer feel confident in the 
health of their democratic institutions. When asked why, many say that money 
has too much of an influence on politics and that politicians are unresponsive to 
the concerns of regular Americans.9 Research supports these fears, showing both 
that wealthy individuals are spending record sums on electoral politics10 and that 
elected officials are at best only weakly accountable to nonwealthy constituents.11 
 
Economic Security (CARES) Act suspended the limit on losses that can be used to offset, for 
tax purposes, nonbusiness income. This provision helps only individuals with more than 
$250,000 in nonbusiness income, and the congressional Joint Committee on Taxation esti-
mates that 82% of the benefits of this part of the Act will go to individuals earning more than 
$1 million a year. Moreover, “[a]ccording to Congress’s official revenue estimators, the bene-
fits of this CARES Act provision this year will go to 43,000 millionaires who receive a total of 
$70.3 billion from this break alone.” Steve Wamhoff, The CARES Act Provision for High-Income 
Business Owners Looks Worse and Worse, JUST TAXES BLOG (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://itep.org/the-cares-act-provision-for-high-income-business-owners-looks-worse-
and-worse [https://perma.cc/M9SH-CQCE]. 
9. See Americans’ Views on Money in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2015/06/02/us/politics/money-in-politics-poll.html [https://perma
.cc/E7NK-ZMVM]; see also Nathaniel Persily & Jon Cohen, Americans Are Losing Faith in De-
mocracy—and in Each Other, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/americans-are-losing-faith-in-democracy--and-in-each-other/2016
/10/14/b35234ea-90c6-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html [https://perma.cc/559P-
W7LA]; Greg Sargent, Why Did Trump Win? New Research by Democrats Offers a Worrisome 
Answer, WASH. POST (May 1, 2017, 8:44 AM EDT), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/05/01/why-did-trump-win-new-research-by-dem-
ocrats-offers-a-worrisome-answer [https://perma.cc/7LNX-WXF6]; Richard Wike, Laura 
Silver & Alexandra Castillo, Many Across the Globe Are Dissatisfied with How Democracy Is Work-
ing, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019
/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working [https://
perma.cc/5ZN9-5M6F]. For a more in-depth account, see ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, 
STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016). 
10. See Matea Gold & Anu Narayanswamy, How 10 Mega-Donors Already Helped Pour a Record $1.1 
Billion into Super PACs, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/how-10-mega-donors-already-helped-pour-a-record-11-billion-into-super-pacs/2016
/10/05/d2d51d44-8a60-11e6-875e-2c1bfe943b66_story.html [https://perma.cc/S78T-KVS6] 
(describing record contributions from “rich donors on both sides of the aisle”); Donor De-
mographics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/donor-de-
mographics?cycle=2020&display=A [https://perma.cc/6NEB-8HZK] (showing group of 
donors comprising 1.11% of U.S. population gave 75.43% of all political contributions in the 
2020 cycle); see also Lobbying Data Summary, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opense-
crets.org/lobby [https://perma.cc/7ZKA-RGQ8] (showing spending on lobbying was high-
est ever in 2019). 
11. See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED 
AGE 2 (1st ed. 2008); MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 12 (2012); Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing The-
ories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. ON POL. 564, 565 
(2014). 
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As political scientist Martin Gilens has observed, “[W]hen preferences between 
the well-off and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no rela-
tionship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”12 
Of course, democracy does not require that policymaking always follow ma-
jority will or the median voter’s preferences. But democracy, as well as the faith 
citizens have in their government, falters when lawmakers persistently disregard 
the priorities of nonwealthy citizens. 
Much of the legal scholarship (and public commentary) concerned with this 
democracy deficit focuses on the increased flow of money into electoral politics 
and advocates for stemming that flow.13 Scholars writing in this vein criticize the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, exemplified by Citizens United v. FEC, that has 
enabled unfettered campaign spending.14 They offer a range of reforms designed 
to limit the flow of money into elections, many of which would require a change 
in the composition of the Supreme Court or the ratification of a constitutional 
amendment.15 A related group of scholars advocates for shielding the legislative 
and administrative process from money’s influence through, for example, lob-
bying restrictions and disclosure requirements.16 
 
12. GILENS, supra note 11, at 81; see also infra Section I.B (discussing empirical findings). 
13. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 6 (2016); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: 
HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 7 (1st ed. 2011). 
14. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see, e.g., HASEN, supra note 13, at 247-48; LESSIG, supra note 13, at 238-39; 
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
15. See HASEN, supra note 13, at 247-50; LESSIG, supra note 13, at 271-72; Michael S. Kang, The 
Brave New World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 576-77 (2016); 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1429 
(2015). Other election-law scholars are less concerned with money’s influence and more con-
cerned with mounting partisanship and political fragmentation. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, 
Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover of Our Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 
845, 845-46 (2017) (bemoaning the weakened political party); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard 
H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2316-30 (2006) (describing 
the problem of partisanship); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmen-
tation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 809 (2014) (arguing for 
strengthening party organization and leadership to reduce the influence of other partisan ac-
tors); see also infra notes 135-136 (describing proposals to reform the outsized effect of money 
in politics). 
16. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text. Lobbying restrictions, too, would be subject 
to constitutional challenge. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (stating 
that “the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment—freedom to speak, publish, and pe-
tition the Government” are involved in the assessment of lobbying regulation); Autor v. Pritz-
ker, 740 F.3d 176, 182-84 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (emphasizing that registered lobbyists are protected 
by the First Amendment, and remanding for the district court to consider whether the policy 
barring government service by registered lobbyists was nonetheless justified). 
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A second robust body of scholarship focuses not on insulating the political 
process from money but on trying to ensure equal rights of individuals to par-
ticipate in the governance process through elections. These scholars criticize bar-
riers to equal voting rights, including contemporary uses of gerrymandering and 
legislation that impose hurdles on individual voters’ ability to exercise the fran-
chise or minimize the effective voting power of particular constituents.17 Schol-
ars urge both doctrinal and legislative reform that would ensure more equal 
rights of participation. 
In the last few years, a third approach has begun to emerge in the legal schol-
arship. This approach begins by recognizing the difficulty—both practical and 
constitutional—of keeping money out of politics. It also recognizes that while 
equal voting and participation rights are critical to the goal of combatting polit-
ical inequality, they are not enough to ensure political equality in a system where 
wealth functions so prominently as an independent source of political influence. 
Thus, this third approach moves beyond campaign finance and individual par-
ticipation rights and focuses instead on what we will call countervailing power. 
In particular, this approach is concerned with the ability of mass-membership 
organizations to equalize the political voice of citizens who lack the political in-
fluence that comes from wealth.18 
The beneficial effects of countervailing, mass-membership organizations are 
well known to theorists and researchers of democracy.19 Put simply, such groups 
increase political equality by building and consolidating political power for the 
 
17. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 
1418-26 (1991) (using the Voting Rights Act to conceptualize the nature of minority-voting 
exclusion); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 
1201, 1216-20, 1227-32 (1996) (arguing for race-conscious districting); Nicholas Stephanop-
oulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 304-23 (2014) (arguing that the key 
issue for districting should be whether district lines properly align the jurisdiction’s median 
voter with the legislature’s median member). 
18. See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN & HOLLIE RUSSON GILMAN, CIVIC POWER: REBUILDING AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA OF CRISIS 142-68 (2019); Kate Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2014) [hereina�er Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy]; Kate An-
drias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 419, 493-503 (2015) [hereina�er Andrias, Separations of Wealth]; Tabatha Abu El-
Haj, Making and Unmaking of Citizens: Law and the Shaping of Civic Capacity, 53 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 63, 98-136 (2019); Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collec-
tive Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148, 168-76 (2013). Some scholars offer more radical approaches 
to furthering countervailing power in governance, for example reserving a significant fraction 
of seats in the legislature for representatives from disadvantaged socioeconomic groups. See 
JULIA CAGÉ, THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY SHAPES POLITICS AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 253-323 (2020); cf. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPAR-
ATIVE EXPLORATION 1-24 (1977) (arguing that a system of consociational democracy can help 
produce stability in plural societies). 
19. See infra Part I. 
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nonwealthy, thus serving as counterweights to the political influence of the rich. 
Mass-membership organizations can serve in this capacity because, at bottom, 
they aggregate the political resources and political power of people who, acting 
as individuals, are disempowered relative to wealthy individuals and institu-
tions.20 More particularly, mass-membership organizations enable pooling of 
politically relevant resources, including money, among individuals with few such 
resources; they provide information to decisionmakers about ordinary citizens’ 
views; they navigate opaque and fragmented government structures, thereby en-
abling citizens to monitor government behavior; and they allow citizens to hold 
decisionmakers accountable. And, in fact, when citizens are organized into mass-
membership associations that are active in the political sphere, researchers find 
an exception to the general rule that policymakers are disproportionally respon-
sive to the preferences and concerns of the wealthy.21 
Over recent decades, however, there has been a decline in broad-based, mass-
membership organizations of low- and middle-income Americans.22 This de-
cline in countervailing organizations has exacerbated the political distortions 
caused by the increase in political spending by the wealthy. But the capacity for 
countervailing organizations to address the distorting effects of wealth raises a 
critical question for legal scholars: How can law facilitate the construction of 
countervailing organizations among the nonwealthy? Put differently, how can 
law facilitate political organizing among Americans whose voices are drowned 
out by the distorting effects of wealth? That is the question we address in this 
Article. 
Recently, legal scholars have begun to address related topics. For example, 
K. Sabeel Rahman and Miriam Sei�er have written about ways that participation 
in administrative processes can improve the organizational strength of citizen 
groups. Thus, Rahman argues for designing administrative processes in ways 
that enhance the countervailing power of ordinary citizens,23 while Sei�er urges 
administrative-law scholars to pay attention to the characteristics of interest 
groups participating in the administrative process and to consider “looking 
 
20. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20 
POL. & SOC’Y 393, 424 (1992) (noting that such organizations help remedy political inequality 
“by permitting individuals with low per capita resources to pool those resources through or-
ganization”). 
21. GILENS, supra note 11, at 121, 157-58. 
22. See infra Section I.A. 
23. K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 97-180 (2016); K. Sabeel Rahman, 
From Civic Tech to Civic Capacity: The Case of Citizen Audits, 50 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 751, 751 
(2017); K. Sabeel Rahman, Policymaking as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 333-
40 (2018) [hereina�er Rahman, Power-Building]; see also infra note 137 (discussing earlier 
work in administrative law on citizen engagement). 
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within interest groups,” referencing the manner by which interest groups deter-
mine the views of their constituents, “to illuminate the quality and nature of 
participation in administrative governance.”24 Tabatha Abu El-Haj has urged 
greater use of universal benefits and targeted philanthropy, to encourage the 
growth of mass-membership organizations, since both “create reasons to organ-
ize on the part of beneficiaries.”25 Both of us have written about the countervail-
ing role that labor organizations can play in politics.26 And Daryl Levinson and 
one of us have written about the ways in which ordinary public policy o�en has 
the effect—and at times the intent—of mobilizing political organization around 
the policy.27 
Meanwhile, another group of legal scholars has highlighted the importance 
of social movements and their organizations in legal change, focusing on how 
movements shape decisionmaking by courts, legislatures, and administrative 
agencies.28 In particular, a rich literature has developed on the relationship be-
tween popular mobilization and evolving constitutional principles, 29  and on 
 
24. Miriam Sei�er, Second-Order Participation in Administrative Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1300, 1304 
(2016); see also Miriam Sei�er, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 146 (2018) (“The weakness of civil society oversight in the states under-
mines the notion that state governments are closer to the people; in turn, it highlights their 
vulnerability to regulatory failures and factional influence.”). 
25. Abu El-Haj, supra note 18, at 71; see also Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 
57 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1129-30, 1132-33 (2016) (“[T]hose concerned about the outsized political 
influence of moneyed elites . . . should shi� [the focus] to ways the law might encourage civic 
reorganization.”). 
26. See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 84-88 (2016); Sachs, supra note 18, at 
168-82. 
27. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 
430-48 (2015). 
28. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW 
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 2-3 (1978); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: 
Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2756-57 (2014); 
Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001). 
29. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COM-
MENT. 427, 503-11 (2007); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946-50 (2006); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Move-
ments, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1501-11 (2005); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 419, 419-20 (2001) [hereina�er Eskridge, Channeling]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2194-2353 (2002); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—
Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47-59 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, 
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De 
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how “cause lawyers” can best serve social movements.30 More recently, there has 
been a resurgence of scholarship that “cogenerates legal meaning alongside le� 
social movements, their organizing, and their visions.”31 This work builds on an 
older tradition of critical legal studies and critical race theory that interrogates 
the limits of traditional legal rights in bringing about progressive social change 
given the political, economic, and social conditions that systematically disad-
vantage poor people and people of color.32 
To date, however, no one has tackled directly the question that we pose 
here.33 Rather than asking how the enactment of substantive legislation or ad-
ministrative-participation mechanisms might boost organizing, how social 
 
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1364 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 307-28 (2001). For a 
helpful synthesis of the literature, see Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and 
Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 878 nn.4-6 (2013). 
30. See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 2-3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold 
eds., 2006); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 
4-9, 74-76, 148-236 (2005); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law 
and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 447 (2001). 
31. See Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar & Jocelyn Simonson, Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2021) (manuscript at 3) (on file with authors); see also infra note 44 (citing legal schol-
arship that engages with contemporary organizing efforts among workers, tenants, debtors, 
and others). 
32. See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND PO-
LITICAL CHANGE 5-6, 14-21, 218-19 (2d ed. 2004) (arguing that the “myth of rights,” including 
the related focus on courts, legitimates existing social arrangements and is unlikely to produce 
fundamental change); Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests 
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 512-13, 516 (1976) (critiquing the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and Education 
Fund’s school desegregation-litigation strategy and its focus on “symbolic manifestations of 
new rights”); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 
2176, 2178 (2013) (arguing that Gideon demonstrates that rights are indeterminate and regres-
sive, failing to improve the situation of most poor people and in some ways worsening their 
plight); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (describing 
rights as unstable, indeterminate, and overly abstract); cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Re-
form, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1331, 1334, 1356 (1988) (finding the critique of rights compelling but “incomplete” 
because it fails “to appreciate fully the transformative significance of the civil rights movement 
in mobilizing Black Americans and generating new demands”). 
33. In prior work we have each made the case that legal scholars and reformers should pay more 
attention to “facilitating the participation of countervailing organizations in government,” An-
drias, Separations of Wealth, supra note 18, at 495, and have argued that “reforms designed to 
facilitate political organizing are more likely to avoid the problems of circumvention that have 
undermined traditional modes of regulation,” Sachs, supra note 18, at 157; see also Andrias, 
Hollowed-Out Democracy, supra note 18. But the extant analysis—including our own—has been 
insufficiently informed by careful consideration of where and how law can successfully facili-
tate and empower mass-membership organizations of nonelites. 
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movements can or hope to reshape law, or how a focus on traditional legal rights 
disables fundamental social change, we ask how law could be used explicitly and 
directly to enable low- and middle-income Americans to build their own social-
movement organizations for political power. 
The question is particularly urgent today as the COVID-19 pandemic has 
exacerbated society’s existing inequalities. Working-class communities, espe-
cially low- and middle-income people of color, have experienced hardships as a 
result of the disease to a far greater extent than the wealthy—from massive un-
employment to dangerous working conditions, from food insecurity to rising 
debt and risk of eviction.34 The suffering wrought by the pandemic, as well as 
by the financial crisis of 2008, has led to an upsurge in protests by low- and 
middle-income Americans, particularly among workers, tenants, and debtors.35 
At the same time, endemic violence against Black communities, including the 
recent killing of George Floyd, has led to widespread organizing around issues 
of racial justice.36 These movements demand that government respond to the 
 
34. See Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens Its 
Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe
/coronavirus-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/9R3V-AMFB]; Adriana Gallardo & Ariel 
Goodman, Los New Yorkers: Essential and Underprotected in the Pandemic’s Epicenter, PROPUB-
LICA (May 2, 2020, 5:00 AM EDT), https://www.propublica.org/article/los-new-yorkers-es-
sential-and-underprotected-in-the-pandemics-epicenter [https://perma.cc/BBJ4-WBQU]; 
Dylan Scott, Covid-19’s Devastating Toll on Black and Latino Americans, in One Chart, VOX (Apr. 
17, 2020, 4:10 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/17/21225610/us-coronavirus-death-
rates-blacks-latinos-whites [https://perma.cc/53C4-Q7PW]. 
35. See, e.g., Harold Meyerson, The Renters’ Revolution, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://prospect.org/blogs/tap/the-renters-revolution [https://perma.cc/5789-MNVE]; 
Noam Scheiber & Kate Conger, Strikes at Instacart and Amazon over Coronavirus Health Con-
cerns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/business/econ-
omy/coronavirus-instacart-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/QPC3-2HHE]. On the upsurge 
in organizing and strikes prior to the pandemic, see, for example, Alexia Fernández Campbell, 
A Record Number of US Workers Went on Strike in 2018, VOX (Feb. 13, 2019, 3:00 PM EST), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/13/18223211/worker-teacher-strikes-
2018-record [https://perma.cc/X9RU-HV6H]; Aaron Ross Coleman, How a Group of Student 
Debtors Took on Their Banks—and Won, GQ (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/debt-
collective-union-organizing [https://perma.cc/HUM5-MUJY]; Noam Scheiber, In a Strong 
Economy, Why Are So Many Workers on Strike?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/10/19/business/economy/workers-strike-economy.html [https://perma.cc
/3WEQ-XLKJ]; and Jimmy Tobias, Meet the Rising New Housing Movement that Wants to Cre-
ate Homes for All, NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-
way-home [https://perma.cc/E5C5-YXGN]. 
36. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Move-
ment in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/B9QU-
B3D6]; see Amna Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for Police Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1787 
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concerns of ordinary Americans and attempt to elicit better treatment from pow-
erful actors. Yet, despite their promise, such movements face significant obsta-
cles in translating their members’ anger into robust and lasting political power.37 
A pressing task, therefore, is to ask how law can facilitate and protect these new 
and revived protest movements, helping to create durable organizations that can 
exercise sustained power in the political economy. 
We start from the premise that the robustness of countervailing, mass-mem-
bership organizations should be understood as a problem both of and for law. 
The shape of civil society and organizational life is already a product of legal 
structures and rules.38 And although law has frequently been a tool of oppres-
sion, rather than of empowerment, of poor and working-class people and move-
ments,39 alternative legal regimes that encourage the growth of and the exercise 
of power by social-movement organizations of the poor and working class are 
possible. Indeed, for those who are committed to decreasing political inequality, 
alternative legal structures that encourage the growth of countervailing organi-
zations are imperative. 
In analyzing how legal and institutional reforms could facilitate a different 
picture of organizational and political life in the United States, we draw from the 
successes and failures of labor law—the area of U.S. law that most explicitly and 
directly creates a right to collective organization for working people—while also 
moving beyond that context to literature considering “how, in what forms, and 
under what conditions social movements become a force for social and political 
change.” 40  We do not attempt to adjudicate priority among factors that 
 
(2020) (arguing that the racial-justice abolitionist movement “aims to contest and then to 
shrink the role of police, ultimately seeking to transform our political, economic, and social 
order to achieve broader social provision for human needs”). 
37. See Steven Greenhouse, Turning Worker Anger into Worker Power, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 29, 
2020), https://prospect.org/labor/turning-worker-anger-into-worker-power [https://
perma.cc/9G87-HTQJ] (discussing the recent upsurge in worker organizing and challenges 
in creating long-term power); Meyerson, supra note 35 (“Over the course of the Great De-
pression, the tenant organizations and leagues of the unemployed won occasional local victo-
ries over specific demands, but failed to become ongoing institutions.”). 
38. See infra notes 147-165 and accompanying text. 
39. See supra note 32 and infra notes 90-91, 162-165. 
40. Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and Transfor-
mation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1753 (2006); see also Doug 
McAdam, Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions, in COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 24-25 (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald 
eds., 1996) (considering definitions and interpretations of the term “political opportunity”); 
sources cited supra notes 38-39. This Article thus seeks to incorporate insights from social 
science into legal scholarship on social movements. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 29 
(identifying three social-movement-theory frameworks); NeJaime, supra note 29, at 879 
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contribute to successful organizing, nor do we attempt to build an exhaustive list 
of such factors. Instead, we consolidate factors that have two attributes: (1) they 
are likely to contribute to the successful building of membership organizations 
among poor and working-class people, and (2) their existence or development 
might be enabled by law. 
We recognize that some factors, undoubtedly critical to successful organiz-
ing, are beyond the reach of our proposal. For example, sociologists and histori-
ans have demonstrated that several structural opportunities helped facilitate the 
growth of the Civil Rights movement, including the collapse of cotton; the in-
crease in Black migration and electoral strength; and the advent of World War 
II and the Cold War.41 These kinds of objective structural conditions, exogenous 
to movements themselves, are frequently important to movement formation, but 
they cannot be directly affected by the kinds of legal reforms we suggest. Like-
wise, sociologists have shown that strategic leadership within organizations is 
critical to movement success,42 but internal leadership dynamics are not easily 
affected through legal regulation.43 
Three additional principles guide our analysis. First, because small-scale, 
concrete victories are essential to successful organizing, and because organizing 
tends to be most successful among people with shared identities and existing 
relationships, we focus on reforms that enable organizing within particular 
structures of authority and resource relations. By way of examples, we consider 
organizing among workers, tenants, debtors, and recipients of public benefits. 
We pick these contexts in part because they are ones rife with exploitation and 
 
(arguing that social-movement scholarship could enable legal scholars to better assess the 
possibilities and limitations of law and courts for contributing to social change); Rubin, supra 
note 28 (describing a divergence between legal scholarship and social-movement scholar-
ship); cf. Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman & Doug McAdam, On Law, Organiza-
tions, and Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 653, 654-55 (2010) (reviewing literature 
and arguing for a synthetic approach to the study of law, social movements, and organiza-
tion); Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 17, 19-20 (2006) (arguing that sociolegal theory and social-movement theory 
should take greater account of one another in part to understand better the efficacy and legacy 
of legal mobilization). 
41. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 11-17 (rev. ed. 2011); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SU-
PREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 4 (2004); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL 
PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 73-83 (2d ed. 1999); 
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUC-
CEED, HOW THEY FAIL 181-84 (1979). 
42. See Marshall Ganz, Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of Cali-
fornia Agriculture, 1959-1966, 105 AM. J. SOC. 1003, 1019 (2000). 
43. That said, some of our proposals may have an indirect effect on factors like strategic-leader-
ship development and political opportunities. 
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power imbalances and populated by the relevant income groups, and in part be-
cause they are home to important organizing efforts, both historical and contem-
porary.44 We do not suggest that these are the only relevant contexts in which 
our suggestions might be explored, nor do we in any sense imply that broader 
organizational development encompassing poor and working-class people as a 
whole is impossible or ineffective. In fact, the context-specific organizing re-
gimes we envision might well facilitate broader community-based and political 
organization. However, we leave for another day exploration of how the law 
might directly enable broad-based political organization—say, a political organ-
ization of all poor people or a political-party system that incentivizes grassroots 
participation among nonwealthy individuals.45 
Second, we focus on how law can build organization, as opposed to more 
amorphous configurations of insurgency. The organizations our reforms seek to 
facilitate are very much social-movement actors, in that they seek to change “el-
ements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society.”46 But the 
goal is to encourage enduring organization that can wield sustained, 
 
44. See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 245, 
269 (2015) (“These movements explicitly use the human right to housing as an organizing 
framework. . . . These movements define their actions as ‘liberating’ homes from the shackles 
of an unjust and immoral housing system that privileges profits over people.”); Luke Herrine, 
The Law and Political Economy of a Student Debt Jubilee, 68 U. BUFF. L. REV. 281, 325 (2020) 
(“In recent years, there have been some signs that more and more student debtors have begun 
to understand their plight not as an individual responsibility but as a collective failure.”). On 
labor exploitation and new worker-organizing efforts, see, for example, Andrias, supra note 
26, at 6, 40-44; and Veena B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of 
Legal Worker Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 67 (2017). Cf. Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care Re-
form and Social Movements in the United States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75, 75 (2003) (asking 
“why there has never been such a movement for universal health care, and whether and how 
one may emerge now and in the future”). 
45. For earlier scholarship examining the relationship between law and the makeup and organi-
zation of political parties, see, for example, Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s 
Over: McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 
175-79; Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 
146-59 (2005); and Pildes, supra note 15, at 828-33. 
46. John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1217-18 (1977). We refer to the organizations interchangeably as 
mass-membership organizations and as social-movement organizations (SMOs). Social-sci-
ence scholars broadly define a social movement as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population 
which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or re-
ward distribution of a society.” Id.; see also Brown-Nagin, supra note 29, at 1503 (defining social 
movements as persistent, interactive campaigns that make “sustained, collective claims for 
relief or redistribution in response to social marginalization, dislocation, change, or crisis” 
(emphasis omitted)); Guinier & Torres, supra note 28, at 2756-57 (defining social move-
ments). 
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countervailing power.47 Thus, our approach rejects the idea that formal struc-
tures facilitated by law are necessarily deradicalizing and inimical to social 
change.48 
Finally, our focus is on how law can facilitate organizations of working-class 
and poor Americans—not on either of two other questions: one, how law could 
be designed specifically to enhance the political power of communities of color, 
or two, how law could encourage the formation of interest groups generally. The 
first question could not be more critical. Just as our government is dispropor-
tionately responsive to the wealthy, it is also disproportionately responsive to 
white people,49 and the crisis of structural racism is perhaps the most acute we 
face as a nation. As such, a program for building political power among commu-
nities of color is just as necessary as a program for building power among work-
ers and the poor. But it is also true that our focus on working and poor Americans 
ought, in practice, and in part due to the crisis of structural racism itself, to 
amount to a program for building power among and by communities of color. 
This is not the exclusive reach of our proposals, and continued attention must 
be paid to ensure that racial inequities do not infect the political organizing we 
aspire to enable. But because people of color are over-represented in the sectors 
of the population that we do address—low-income workers, tenants, govern-
ment-benefits recipients, debtors—these communities would likely benefit from 
the success of our proposals. As to the second question, while a more expansive 
civil society may bring a host of benefits, including greater social cohesion and 
civic education, this Article’s concern is with building organizations that can 
serve as a countervailing force to the extraordinary power of economic elites in 
our political economy.50 
 
47. See MCADAM, supra note 41, at 54-56 (emphasizing the importance of enduring organization). 
48. Cf. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41 (providing a history of four disruptive social movements, 
and arguing that organization is o�en antithetical to movement success among poor people). 
For further discussion, see infra note 370 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., BRIAN F. SCHAFFNER, JESSE H. RHODES & RAYMOND J. LA RAJA, HOMETOWN INEQUAL-
ITY: RACE, CLASS, AND REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN LOCAL POLITICS 13-14 (2020) (“Whites 
and wealthier people receive substantially more ideological representation both from local 
government officials and from municipal policy outputs than do nonwhites and less wealthy 
individuals. The inequities in representation we identify are frequently shocking in their mag-
nitude.”); John Griffin, Zoltan Hajnal, Brian Newman & David Searle, Political Inequality in 
America: Who Loses on Spending Policy? When Is Policy Less Biased?, 7 POL. GROUPS & IDENTI-
TIES 367, 368 (2019) (“[T]he racial inequalities we uncover are as large as, and o�en larger 
than, income-based bias.”). 
50. Other work examines the value of robust civil society more broadly. E.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, 
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); THEDA 
SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIFE (2003). 
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We argue that a legal regime designed to enable this kind of organizing 
should have several components. First, the law should grant collective rights in 
an explicit and direct way so as to create a “frame” that encourages organizing. 
Second, as importantly, though more prosaically, the law should provide for a 
reliable, administrable, and sustainable source of financial, informational, hu-
man, and other relevant resources. Third, the law should guarantee free spaces—
both physical and digital—in which movement organization can occur, free from 
surveillance or control. Fourth, the law should remove barriers to participation, 
both by protecting all those involved from retaliation—no worker may be fired, 
no tenant evicted, no debtor penalized, and no welfare recipient deprived of ben-
efits because they are active in or supportive of the movement’s efforts—and by 
removing material obstacles that make it difficult for poor and working people 
to organize. Fi�h, the law should provide the organizations with ways to make 
material change in their members’ lives and should create mechanisms for the 
exercise of real political and economic power, for example by providing the right 
to “bargain” with the relevant set of private actors and by facilitating organiza-
tional participation in governmental processes. Finally, the law should enable 
contestation and disruption, offering protections for the right to protest and 
strike.51 
The particulars necessarily vary by context. For example, a law designed to 
generate organizing among tenants would start by affirmatively granting tenants 
the right to form and join tenant unions. It would grant such unions the right to 
access information and landlord property for organizational purposes. It would 
vest the organization with authority to collect dues payments through deduc-
tions from rent payments. It would mandate that landlords negotiate with ten-
ants’ organizations over rent and housing conditions. It would ensure that or-
ganizations have special rights of participation in administrative processes 
related to housing policy. And it would provide for the right of tenants to engage 
in rent strikes and protests, free from retaliation. A law designed to facilitate or-
ganizing among debtors would similarly create a collective frame, provide a 
mechanism for funding, protect against retaliation, mandate bargaining and 
 
51. Some, though not all, of the interventions we propose might require the state to determine 
which organizations are entitled to the law’s benefits. For example, if the government directly 
funds organizations, or requires bargaining with organizations, or mandates access to prop-
erty for organizations, the law might need to establish criteria according to which organiza-
tions qualify (or don’t) for the entitlements in question. Current labor law offers one, quite 
imperfect model: many legal entitlements (the employers’ bargaining obligation, for exam-
ple) are granted when, and only when, a union can demonstrate support from a majority of 
the relevant group of workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2018). This model could be modified 
so that some threshold showing of support—short of a majority—is required before the or-
ganization could avail itself of the relevant legal right. This administrability question is an 
important one but is beyond the scope of the current Article. 
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rights of participation in governance, and protect the right to protest and strike, 
but a debtor-organizing law might not provide for access to physical spaces, in-
stead putting more emphasis on providing information and enabling online or-
ganizing. 
Some of our proposals will generate resistance—theoretical, legal, and polit-
ical. And, indeed, we concede that our approach has limitations. For example, 
we do not attempt to articulate the optimal level of political influence that the 
organizations in question ought to enjoy, nor a way of measuring when and 
whether they have become sufficiently strong. As Richard Pildes has written in 
a related context, we believe it is possible to “identify what is troublingly unfair, 
unequal, or wrong without a precise standard of what is optimally fair, equal, or 
right.”52 In addition, the scope of our inquiry is limited to problems of economic 
inequality. Yet we do not mean in any way to minimize other aspects of inequal-
ity, including racial and gender discrimination and hierarchy, which are both in-
separable from economic inequality and worthy of separate examination and in-
tervention. To that end, we believe law ought to require inclusion and 
nondiscrimination among poor and working people’s social-movement organi-
zations.53 
Finally, we recognize both that our recommendations will not provide a pan-
acea to the imbalance in power that characterizes our political economy and that 
our proposals will be difficult to enact. Indeed, although we suggest a range of 
possible reforms and explain how they could be achieved, the goal is to illumi-
nate law’s constitutive potential and to suggest a path for further work, not to 
provide a comprehensive blueprint.54 In short, analysis of what makes poor and 
working people’s social-movement organizations succeed helps show that law 
 
52. Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (1999). 
53. Labor law provides a useful example for much in this Article, including the profound risk of 
racial and gender exclusion. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), for example, en-
trenched and perpetuated certain forms of race- and gender-based oppression by excluding 
from statutory coverage occupational groups—like domestic workers and agricultural work-
ers—where Black, Latino, and women workers are disproportionately represented. See IRA 
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INE-
QUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53-61 (2005); see also infra note 384 (describing 
requirements of nondiscrimination, inclusion, and antisubordination that might be imposed 
on social-movement organizations to prevent internal domination along lines of race, class, 
and gender). 
54. A host of institutional-design questions, specific to particular constituencies and contexts, are 
thus beyond the scope of this paper. 
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can make a difference—and that the absence of such law is a choice, one we be-
lieve our society cannot afford to make.55 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the prob-
lem by tracing the relationship between rising economic inequality and the de-
cline of mass-membership organizations, on the one hand, and political respon-
siveness on the other. It also explains why this form of inequality is a problem, 
theoretically, for a democratic republic, and describes existing approaches to us-
ing law as a mechanism for addressing political inequality. Part II details, at a 
high level of generality, the promise of legal intervention to encourage organiza-
tion, drawing on historical and contemporary examples and underlining the ex-
tent to which the absence of such regimes is a political choice that favors a par-
ticular distribution of power. Part III uses social-science research and lessons 
from labor law to elaborate the conditions necessary for poor and working-class 
organizations to thrive and explains how law can facilitate the existence of such 
conditions in a range of contexts. Finally, in conclusion, we explain why progress 
toward a law of organizing might be feasible, notwithstanding significant obsta-
cles. 
i .  inequality,  democracy,  and countervailing 
organizations  
A. The Unequal Landscape of Political Organization 
At every stage of the electoral and governing process, wealthy Americans 
dominate.56 They vote at higher rates, they contribute more frequently and in 
greater amounts to campaigns, they volunteer more o�en on political cam-
paigns, and they are more likely to contact a representative about an issue.57 In 
 
55. The legal reforms we suggest are targeted to generate organizing among people in specific 
income classes but not targeted to generate political organizing among people who hold spe-
cific political views. As a result, it is possible that our reforms would facilitate organizing by 
those who hold reactionary views as well as those who hold progressive ones. Of course, it 
will remain critical to combat discriminatory and exclusionary political developments through 
other means. 
56. KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY E. BRADY, THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UN-
EQUAL POLITICAL VOICE AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 6-8, 14 (2012); 
see also id. at 122 & n.8, 136, 169, 197 (demonstrating that the higher the socioeconomic-status 
quintile to which a person belongs, the more likely he or she is to vote, contribute money to a 
campaign, engage in political discussion daily, be more persistently politically active over time, 
and to have come from a politically engaged family). 
57. See id. at 136. 
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addition, wealthy individuals are, and have always been, far more likely to serve 
as elected and appointed leaders than are working-class and poor Americans.58 
The story of how economic elites, as individuals, dominate campaign spend-
ing, lobbying, and elected office is likely familiar to most readers. Less well 
known is the relationship between inequality and political organization. Here, 
too, the picture is one of domination by the wealthy. Those in the top income 
quintile, for example, are far more active in organized political groups.59 They 
can more easily bear the economic costs of organization, and they are more likely 
to possess the skills, information, resources, and media savvy essential to the 
successful functioning of such groups.60 Similarly, business organizations are 
dominant in both federal- and state-level politics. Indeed, the majority of orga-
nized, national political groups focus on economic issues, and of these, more 
than three-quarters represent business interests.61 Over three-fourths of lobby-
ing expenditures are made on behalf of corporate America.62 Political participa-
tion by business and the wealthy, moreover, vastly outpaces participation by or-
ganizations of the nonwealthy: business groups outnumber and far outspend 
organizations of working-class and poor Americans.63 
 
58. NICHOLAS CARNES, WHITE-COLLAR GOVERNMENT: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CLASS IN ECONOMIC 
POLICY MAKING 107-08 (2013). 
59. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 259-61; see also id. at 276 (“[B]arriers to entry into the 
political fray have potential consequences for the representation—and, in particular, for the 
equal representation—of citizen interests.”). 
60. For discussion of why the wealthy are better able to organize, see id. at 316-17; see also E.E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 35 (1960) (discussing the disproportionate role that the wealthy play in political or-
ganizing). 
61. See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 320, 322 (noting that “[m]ore than two-thirds of the 
organized interests in Washington are institutions or membership associations directly related 
to the joint political concerns that arise from economic roles and interests” and those repre-
senting business constitute more than three-quarters of these). 
62. LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS BECAME POLIT-
ICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 8-9 (2015). In fact, these numbers signifi-
cantly undercount the true corporate investments in politics, because many activities seeking 
to influence the political process are not captured by lobbying-disclosure rules. See id. at 9. 
63. Id. But see SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 419 (noting that participation in litigation via 
amicus briefs is one exception). One study found that “72 percent of expenditures on lobbying 
originate with organizations representing business.” SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 442. 
Another concluded that “[l]obbying expenditures by corporations and trade associations rep-
resent more than 84% of total interest group lobbying expenditures at the US federal level.” 
John M. de Figueiredo & Brian Kelleher Richter, Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying, 
17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 165 (2014). A single business group, the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, spent $1.62 billion lobbying the federal government between 1998 and 2020, Top 
Spenders, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?
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This inequality in political organization has not always been so severe. In the 
years a�er the Civil War until the mid-twentieth century, American civil society 
was made up of numerous federated organizations with membership from the 
working class. 64  In the early twentieth century, labor organizations like the 
Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor, and the early industrial un-
ions, along with civic organizations like the National Consumers League and 
National Urban League, engaged millions of low- and middle-income Ameri-
cans and immigrants in grassroots political activity. Members participated in or-
ganizational meetings, decisionmaking, and leadership, as well as in political ac-
tion at the local, state, and federal levels. Notably, these organizations were 
primarily member-funded. They were by no means perfect—some were exclu-
sionary or segregated on the basis of race or gender—but they engaged Ameri-
cans in democratic, political activity at all levels.65 
Progressive era intellectuals, writing against the background of a political 
economy with significant parallels to today’s, understood that working people’s 
organizations could redistribute power over political decisionmaking and 
thereby could ensure a more egalitarian political economy.66 John Dewey, for ex-
ample, wrote of a society of citizens whose equality was guaranteed by their par-
ticipation in voluntary associations with real power in the governance process.67 
 
showYear=a&indexType=s [https://perma.cc/K8VR-AFK2], compared to $889 million by all 
labor unions combined, Ranked Sectors, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., https://www.opense-
crets.org/federal-lobbying/ranked-sectors?cycle=a [https://perma.cc/H9JZ-JZN3]. The top 
three healthcare-industry groups spent more than three times as much on lobbying during 
this period as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). See Top Spenders, supra. 
64. SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 152-57. 
65. Id. at 98-158; see also SUZANNE METTLER, SOLDIERS TO CITIZENS: THE G.I. BILL AND THE MAK-
ING OF THE GREATEST GENERATION 2-5 (2005) (noting the ways in which civic organizations 
prepared Americans for participation in democratic politics); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 
56, at 148 (discussing the role of labor unions in mobilizing voters). 
66. See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE NATIONAL RE-
COVERY ADMINISTRATION 50 (1988) (describing progressives’ commitment to encouraging 
broad participation in economic decisionmaking in order to achieve fundamental structural 
changes in the economy); BILL NOVAK, A NEW DEMOCRACY: LAW AND THE CREATION OF THE 
MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1866-1932 (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 51, 57-65) (on file 
with authors) (arguing that Progressive era “reformers had a thicker and more substantive 
conception of what was entailed by democracy than the comparatively thin renderings of de-
liberation, representation, voting, or office that prevail at present”); MARC STEARS, DEMAND-
ING DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN RADICALS IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLITICS 94-97, 105-14 (2010) 
(describing the rise of industrial unions and their relationship to Progressive era democratic 
theory); ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 434-39 (1991) 
(discussing Dewey’s efforts to develop a workable form of democratic socialism). 
67. John Dewey, What Are We Fighting for?, INDEPENDENT, Apr.-June 1918, at 482. For further 
discussion of progressive and New Deal approaches to working-class membership 
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Public opinion and the ballot, he argued, were insufficient tools to achieve 
change. For the public to solve its problems, organizations of citizens, and or-
ganizations of working-class Americans in particular, “needed concrete ways to 
exercise power over the range of economic and political decision making.”68 
Following the Great Depression and the resulting protest movements among 
the unemployed and industrial workers, the New Deal fostered a rapid growth 
in the organization of the working class.69 In 1935, Congress enacted the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which guaranteed workers the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively with their employers.70 In 1935, John Lewis of the 
United Mineworkers and Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Textile Workers 
Union formed the new Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO), with the 
goal of organizing all workers, immigrant and native-born, male and female.71 
The CIO’s success was remarkable. In the year following the United Auto Work-
ers strike at General Motors in Michigan, nearly five million workers took part 
in industrial action, and almost three million joined a union.72 Over the next 
decade, unions continued to grow, with some becoming a vehicle for the em-
powerment of Black Americans as well as a force for rising living standards, 
workplace democracy, and political change.73 
The 1950s and 60s saw the rise of several new transformative social move-
ments among low- and middle-income Americans. 74  In particular, the Civil 
Rights movement organized Black Americans and their allies, engaging them in 
a political struggle against racial injustice, including its economic dimensions.75 
 
organizations and their role in government, see Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social 
Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 625-33 
(2019). 
68. Andrias, supra note 67, at 648. 
69. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933-1941, 
at 37-61 (1970); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LA-
BOR 18 (2013); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41, at 44-76; ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO 1935-
1955, at 16-17 (1995). 
70. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2018). 
71. See, e.g., MELVYN DUBOFSKY & WARREN VAN TINE, JOHN L. LEWIS: A BIOGRAPHY 162-63 
(1986); LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 69, at 43-53. See generally STEVEN FRASER, LABOR WILL 
RULE: SIDNEY HILLMAN AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN LABOR 329-48 (1991) (describing Hill-
man’s founding goals for the Committee for Industrial Organization). 
72. LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 69, at 51-52. 
73. Id. at 78-85, 104. 
74. SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 127-38. 
75. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS: 1963-65, at 210-11 (1998); 
MICHAEL K. HONEY, TO THE PROMISED LAND: MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE FIGHT FOR ECO-
NOMIC JUSTICE 1-16 (2018); MCADAM, supra note 41, at 75-84; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 
41, at 181-211. 
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The National Welfare Rights Organization and numerous related community-
based groups organized welfare recipients and the poor more generally.76 Union 
organization among service workers and public-sector workers expanded during 
this period as well.77 
By the 1970s, however, membership organizations began to decline in prom-
inence. 78  Theda Skocpol estimates that membership in the federated mass-
membership organizations built in the Progressive and New Deal eras dropped 
by sixty percent between 1974 and 1994.79 Today, less than a third of the organ-
izational advocates operating in Washington are membership associations of any 
kind, and only about an eighth are membership associations of individuals.80 
Although groups associated with the 1960s social movements have survived, 
they are no longer democratically governed mass-membership organizations. 
Most are now professionally managed advocacy groups, organized as charitable 
nonprofits funded mainly by wealthy donors.81 
Labor unions stand as an exception to this dominant model. Their member-
ship and funding are still drawn from working Americans, and unions are still 
federated, national organizations whose members have governance rights and 
the organizational capacity to exercise power in the political economy.82 Unions 
provide voice for millions of Americans, enabling workers to improve collectively 
 
76. See NICK KOTZ & MARY LYNN KOTZ, A PASSION FOR EQUALITY: GEORGE A. WILEY AND THE 
MOVEMENT 15-21 (1977); PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 41, at 264-96. 
77. See, e.g., LEON FINK & BRIAN GREENBERG, UPHEAVAL IN THE QUIET ZONE: A HISTORY OF HOS-
PITAL WORKERS’ UNION, LOCAL 1199, at 17-27 (1989); MARJORIE MURPHY, BLACKBOARD UN-
IONS: THE AFT AND THE NEA, 1900-1980, at 213-29 (1990); JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORK-
ERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS, THE LAW, AND THE STATE, 1900-1962, at 1-12 (2004). 
78. See SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 135-38; see also PUTNAM, supra note 50, at 27, 48-64 (showing 
Americans have become increasingly disconnected from one another and that institutions 
have disintegrated); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 320, 322 (describing the relative lack 
of organization among lower-income groups and the overwhelming dominance of elites and 
business interests in lobbying). 
79. SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 212-19. 
80. Id. at 212-19; see SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 319. 
81. See SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 319; SKOCPOL, supra note 50, at 212-19; David Pozen, 
The Tax-Code Shi� That’s Changing Liberal Activism, ATLANTIC (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/501c3-501c4-activists-and-tax-code
/576364 [https://perma.cc/V8WA-MZX4]; see also DANA R. FISHER, ACTIVISM, INC.: HOW 
THE OUTSOURCING OF GRASSROOTS CAMPAIGNS IS STRANGLING PROGRESSIVE POLITICS IN 
AMERICA 73 (2006) (describing the outsourcing of grassroots organizing). For further discus-
sion of funding dynamics, see infra Section III.B.1. 
82. The other major exceptions include the AARP and the National Rifle Association, which 
maintain federated membership structures and continue to wield significant power, but nei-
ther focuses on organizing working-class or poor Americans on the basis of their class inter-
ests. See Abu El-Haj, supra note 18, at 95-97. 
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their wages, benefits, and working conditions.83 They also have significant po-
litical and civic impact by educating workers about political issues, mobilizing 
them to support political candidates, contributing financially to political cam-
paigns, and successfully advocating for policy changes at the local, state, and fed-
eral levels. 84  Researchers have found that unions are remarkably effective at 
boosting voter turnout, particularly among the least educated and least well-rep-
resented in the electorate.85 States with higher union density tend to have higher 
turnout rates among the working class.86 And union members, as a result of their 
experience with politically impactful and democratic organizations, tend to join 
more civic associations. 87  In short, unions enable workers to participate 
 
83. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984); JAKE ROSEN-
FELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO (2014); David Card, The Effect of Unions on Wage Ine-
quality in the U.S. Labor Market, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 296 (2001); Bruce Western & Jake 
Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513 (2011); 
Henry S. Farber, Daniel Herbst, Ilyana Kuziemko & Suresh Naidu, Unions and Inequality over 
the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 24587, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24587.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3HV2-74WP]; Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, William Kimball & Thomas Kochan, 
How U.S. Workers Think About Workplace Democracy: The Structure of Individual Worker 
Preferences for Labor Representation (Aug. 28, 2019) (unpublished working paper) (on file 
with the Washington Center for Equitable Growth), https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/08/WP-Workplace-Democracy-Hertel-Fernandez-Kimball-Kochan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JS47-5NZ6]. For a philosophical account that elaborates the harm to dem-
ocratic society when workers lack basic rights at work, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE 
GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR LIVES (AND WHY WE DON’T TALK ABOUT IT) 
(2017). 
84. See JOHN S. AHLQUIST & MARGARET LEVI, IN THE INTEREST OF OTHERS: ORGANIZATIONS AND 
SOCIAL ACTIVISM (2013); SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56; DANIEL SCHLOZMAN, WHEN 
MOVEMENTS ANCHOR PARTIES: ELECTORAL ALIGNMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2015); Her-
tel-Fernandez et al., supra note 83; Sung Eun Kim & Yotam Margalit, Informed Preferences? The 
Impact of Unions on Workers’ Policy Views, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 728 (2017); Jan E. Leighley & 
Jonathan Nagler, Unions, Voter Turnout, and Class Bias in the U.S. Electorate, 1964-2004, 69 J. 
POL. 430 (2007). 
85. ROSENFELD, supra note 83, at 170, 173; Richard B. Freeman, What, Me Vote?, in 1 SOCIAL INE-
QUALITY 714-15 (Kathryn M. Neckerman ed., 2004); see also Sean McElwee, How Unions Boost 
Democratic Participation, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 16, 2015), https://prospect.org/labor/unions-
boost-democratic-participation [https://perma.cc/Q6ET-5E8M] (collecting research that 
shows a positive correlation between union membership and voting). 
86. Benjamin Radcliff & Patricia Davis, Labor Organization and Electoral Participation in Industrial 
Democracies, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 132, 136-38 (2000). 
87. See McElwee, supra note 85. 
the yale law journal 130:546  2021 
568 
collectively at every level of politics and government, equalizing power in the 
political economy and providing a countervailing voice to organized business 
groups.88 
At their high point in the 1950s, unions represented about a third of work-
ers.89 Since the 1970s, however, the labor movement’s size and power have de-
clined considerably. This is partly a result of weaknesses in the original NLRA, 
antiunion reforms in the 1947 Ta�-Hartley Act, and a host of Supreme Court 
decisions that privilege employers’ managerial and property rights over workers’ 
right to organize. A�er decades of capital flight, the fissuring of the employment 
relationship, and intense managerial resistance, unions now represent only 
about six percent of employees in the private sector and ten percent of the labor 
force overall. 90  Recently enacted antiunion laws in previously union-dense 
states, along with the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American Federation 
of State, County & Municipal Employees, further threaten unions’ ability to exer-
cise effective political voice.91 In short, unions remain politically active and con-
tinue to provide substantial resources to proworker candidates, but because 
 
88. See JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON 
MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 57 (2010) 
(“[O]rganized labor’s role is not limited to union participation in the determination of wages. 
Much more fundamental is the potential for unions to offer an organizational counterweight 
to the power of those at the top.”); ROSENFELD, supra note 83, at 4-8. For theoretical accounts 
of the importance of collective rights to democracy, see ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECO-
NOMIC DEMOCRACY 5-6 (1985), which states that, “of the various kinds of equality that might 
exist in a good society, political equality is surely one of the most crucial, . . . including . . . the 
freedom to help determine, in cooperation with others, the laws and rules that one must 
obey”; and Alex Gourevitch, The Right to Strike: A Radical View, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 905, 
905, 909-15 (2018), which argues that “every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have 
a right to strike” because workers need the ability to resist “the oppression that workers face 
in the standard liberal capitalist economy.” 
89. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2004) (“As a percent of wage and salary employment and a percent of total 
employment, union membership peaked in 1954 at 34.8% and 28.3%, respectively.”). 
90. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 22, 2020, 10:00 
AM EST), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/36B5-
6EFF]. For a discussion of the causes of the decline, including the role of a weak legal regime, 
see ROSENFELD, supra note 83, at 10-30; LANE WINDHAM, KNOCKING ON LABOR’S DOOR: UN-
ION ORGANIZING IN THE 1970S AND THE ROOTS OF A NEW ECONOMIC DIVIDE 6-9 (2017); An-
drias, supra note 26, at 6-7; and Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and 
the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1978). 
91. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). See generally Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 21 
(discussing recently enacted antiunion laws, as well as the evolution of Supreme Court doc-
trine). 
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there are so few of them and their funding is increasingly under attack, they rep-
resent a declining share of organizational activity in politics and governance.92 
B. Political Inequality in a Democratic Republic 
The impact of these developments on the health of American democracy is 
stark. Political scientists including Larry Bartels, Martin Gilens, and Benjamin 
Page are finding that government policymaking is responsive to the views of 
poor- and middle-income Americans only in settings where the balance of inter-
est-group power aligns with the preferences of these income groups. 93 This 
finding confirms the critical role played by political organization, but it also con-
firms that in contemporary America—where the wealthy dominate political or-
ganization—government is by and large unresponsive to the views of the vast 
majority of citizens.94 
By examining two thousand public-opinion surveys conducted between 1981 
and 2002, and federal policy adoption during that same period, Gilens estimated 
the extent to which different income groups influence policy outcomes.95 His 
findings are unambiguous: with a single exception, “when preferences between 
the well-off and the poor diverge, government policy bears absolutely no 
 
92. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 88, at 179-80; SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 368-
69. In 2012, corporations spent $2.57 billion on reportable lobbying expenditures, which 
amounted to fi�y-six times the amount spent by unions. DRUTMAN, supra note 62, at 8-9, 14. 
Recent court decisions prohibiting unions from collecting fees from objecting workers, while 
maintaining the obligation that unions represent such workers, further weaken unions’ eco-
nomic and political position. See, e.g., Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448; Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 
(2014). 
93. See BARTELS, supra note 11; GILENS, supra note 11; Gilens & Page, supra note 11. 
94. As with all empirical findings, there is debate about the extent to which Gilens’s and Page’s 
findings hold up. See Dylan Matthews, Remember that Study Saying America Is an Oligarchy? 3 
Rebuttals Say It’s Wrong., VOX (May 9, 2016, 8:00 AM EDT), https://www.vox
.com/2016/5/9/11502464/gilens-page-oligarchy-study [https://perma.cc/HCT5-ALN9] 
(summarizing the critiques). But see Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Critics Argued with 
Our Analysis of U.S. Political Inequality. Here Are 5 Ways They’re Wrong., WASH. POST (May 23, 
2016 12:00 PM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016
/05/23/critics-challenge-our-portrait-of-americas-political-inequality-heres-5-ways-they-
are-wrong [https://perma.cc/ELP9-JX2A] (responding to critics); Sean McElwee, To Influ-
ence Policy, You Have to Be More than Rich, WASH. MONTHLY (Feb. 16, 2016), https://wash-
ingtonmonthly.com/2016/02/16/to-influence-policy-you-have-to-be-more-than-rich 
[https://perma.cc/JN3S-QMKT] (“[A] full accounting of the evidence leaves the core finding 
of Gilens and Page standing: the views of the wealthy are disproportionately represented by 
policymakers, and representation for low and middle income Americans primarily comes 
from their congruence with the wealthy.”). 
95. GILENS, supra note 11, at 53. 
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relationship to the degree of support or opposition among the poor.”96 Moreo-
ver, even when the poor and middle class agree with each other and disagree 
with the wealthy, it is still the views of the wealthy that predominate. Hence, “for 
Americans below the top of the income distribution, any association between 
preferences and policy outcomes is likely to reflect the extent to which their pref-
erences coincide with those of the affluent.”97 The rare exception occurs when 
organized political-group power is aligned with the preferences of the poor and 
middle class.98 
The Gilens findings, moreover, hardly stand alone. Other recent work reveals 
that “the views of constituents in the bottom third of the income distribution 
receive[] no weight at all in the voting decisions of their [S]enators.”99 Likewise, 
Presidents o�en respond to the “narrow political and economic interests” of the 
wealthy. 100  And, at the state level, “the poor have next to no influence 
over . . . policy.” 101  Summarizing these findings, Gilens and Page conclude 
bluntly that in twenty-first-century America, “the majority does not rule—at 
least not in the causal sense of actually determining policy outcomes.”102 
A political system in which government policy is responsive to the prefer-
ences of the wealthy few rather than to the majority of citizens may be more 
accurately categorized as an oligarchy than as a democracy or a republic. 103 
 
96. Id. at 81. 
97. Id. at 83. 
98. Id. at 122-23. 
99. BARTELS, supra note 11, at 254. 
100. JAMES N. DRUCKMAN & LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, WHO GOVERNS?: PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC OPIN-
ION, AND MANIPULATION, at xiii (2015). 
101. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1578 (2015); see 
also Elizabeth Rigby & Gerald C. Wright, Political Parties and Representation of the Poor in the 
American States, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 552, 552 (2013) (finding that low-income preferences rarely 
“get incorporated in parties’ campaign appeals at [the] early stage in the policymaking pro-
cess”). Scholars are beginning to examine how race and gender interact with income for pur-
poses of representation, with early studies suggesting that Black Americans are particularly 
likely to be ignored by policymakers. See Griffin et al., supra note 49, at 368. 
102. Gilens & Page, supra note 11, at 576. 
103. Like the political-science literature on which we rely, we use the term “preferences.” However, 
we are not of the view that preferences are in any sense static or that the relationship between 
preferences and policymaking is unidirectional. Indeed, our analysis proceeds on the assump-
tion that preferences are dynamic and subject to change through processes that include or-
ganizing. Put differently, the idea that government should respond to the preferences, priori-
ties, and concerns of constituents is consistent with the idea that those preferences change 
over time through deliberation, contestation, and collective debate. Cf. Lisa Disch, Democratic 
Representation and the Constituency Paradox, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 599, 610 (2012) (challenging 
the focus on responsiveness to preferences and concluding that “[t]he fundamental 
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Indeed, in an influential recent book, political-science professor Jeffrey Winters 
defends the claim that the United States is now functioning as an oligarchy. As 
he describes the current political reality, “regardless of the other ways in which 
political power might be equal—such as one-person-one-vote or an equal right 
to speak or participate—yawning differences in material power create enormous 
inequalities in political influence and account for key political outcomes won by 
oligarchs.”104 But, whether best described as an oligarchy or not, the lack of gov-
ernment responsiveness to the views and desires of the vast majority of citizens 
is a serious problem for a democratic republic. 
Indeed, nearly all democratic theorists consider responsiveness to constitu-
ents as an important feature of a functioning democracy.105 As Robert Dahl put 
it, “[A] key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.”106 
Hannah Pitkin, explicating the complicated nature of representation, concluded 
that, at the very least, representatives “must not be found persistently at odds 
with the wishes of the represented.”107 So, too, the Supreme Court, even as it has 
struck down campaign-finance regulations, has reiterated that “responsiveness 
is key to the very concept of self-governance through elected officials.”108 Nich-
olas Stephanopoulos puts this widely accepted point in terms of political “align-
ment,” arguing that alignment occurs when “the preferences of voters are con-
gruent with the preferences of their elected representatives,” with respect to 
partisan affiliation, public-policy views, and public-policy outcomes.109 He ar-
gues that Madisonian, minimalist, pluralist, participatory, and deliberative dem-
ocrats all put some version of alignment between voter preferences and repre-
sentative behavior as an important component of their views of what comprises 
“democracy.”110 
 
democratic deficiency of US politics is that it has taken on an organizational form that gives 
wealthy interests a significant strategic advantage while at the same time making it increas-
ingly unlikely that opposition would mobilize through electoral politics”). 
104. JEFFREY A. WINTERS, OLIGARCHY 214 (2011). 
105. We do not believe that responsiveness is the only important normative goal in a democracy, 
nor is it the only goal served by our proposals. See infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
106. ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971). 
107. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967). Pitkin allows, how-
ever, for divergence with “good reason in terms of the[] interest” of the represented. Id. 
108. McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014). 
109. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 287. 
110. Id. at 313-16. 
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Although the relationship between preferences and policymakers in a de-
mocracy is neither simple nor unidirectional,111 the current U.S. government de-
scribed by Bartels, Gilens, Page, and others is one defined, quite simply, by mis-
alignment and unresponsiveness: the concerns of the majority are rarely reflected 
in government policy unless by coincidence, and instead that policy aligns with 
the preferences and priorities of a small, wealthy minority. This mismatch is a 
problem, moreover, not just from the perspective of democratic government, but 
from the perspective of republican government as well.112 
The Constitution, of course, requires that the “United States . . . guarantee 
to every state in this Union a Republican Form of Government,”113 a guarantee 
taken to extend to the structure of the federal government as well.114 As with 
democracy, there is robust debate about the particular characteristics of a “re-
publican form of government,” but widespread agreement exists about its core 
 
111. See Lisa Disch, Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation, 105 AM. POL. SCI. 
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play); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 515, 518 (2003) 
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the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, exposes government officials to more of the public’s 
views, and connects voters more closely to their representatives. See, e.g., Christopher S. 
Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures for a Structural Theory of the 
Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 677 (2008); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: 
Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-11 (1993); see also Steven L. Win-
ter, ‘Down Freedom’s Main Line,’ 41 NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL. 202, 203 (2012) (“Democracy’s moral 
appeal lies not in the promise of an impossible radical freedom, but in the commitment to 
equal participation in determining the terms and conditions of social life—what, even before 
the currency of the term ‘democracy,’ the ancient Greeks called isonomia.”). As such, the re-
forms urged in this paper should appeal even to those scholars who argue that because public 
opinion is “a continuous process” that is “never definitively represented,” “[t]here is thus no 
‘baseline’ from which ‘distortion’ can be assessed.” ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAM-
PAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (2014). Moreover, though adequate dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this Article, normative theories of nondomination, self-deter-
mination, and agonism also lend support to the kinds of organizational reforms this Article 
advocates. On nondomination, see Harry Arthurs, Labor Law as the Law of Economic Subordi-
nation and Resistance: A Thought Experiment, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 585, 602 (2013); and 
ANDERSON, supra note 83, at 64-71. On self-determination, see, for example, Hanoch Dagan, 
Autonomy and Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 185-86, 187-88, 
199-202 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds., 2020). On agonism and the im-
portance of contestation, see CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITI-
CALLY 5-9 (2013); and Disch, supra note 103, at 610-11. 
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
114. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
1427, 1429 (2016). 
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features. Akhil Amar, for example, concludes that “majority rule popular sover-
eignty” is a “central pillar” and the “central meaning” of Republican govern-
ment.115 Quoting from Federalist No. 39, Amar concludes, “Republicanism must 
be defined as against aristocracy and monarchy—as ‘a government which derives 
all its powers . . . from the great body of the people.’”116 
Like Amar, both Jack Balkin and William Forbath define republican govern-
ment by way of contrast to aristocracy and, of particular relevance here, to oli-
garchy. Balkin explains, “[T]he Founders opposed republicanism . . . to monar-
chy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. A republic is therefore an antimonarchical, 
antiaristocratic, and anti-oligarchical form of government.” 117  And Forbath 
warns, “You cannot have a constitutional republic, or what the Framers called a 
‘republican form of government’ . . . in the context of gross material inequality 
among citizens [because] gross economic inequality produces an oligarchy in 
which the wealthy rule.”118 
C. Extant Approaches to Using Law to Combat Political Inequality 
In light of the problems for democratic and republican government posed by 
the current unresponsiveness of American government, legal interventions de-
signed to rebalance political power as between the wealthy and the nonwealthy 
are essential.119 The public-law literature has identified ways in which extant law 
 
115. Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority 
Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749, 751 (1994). In support, Amar 
draws extensively on Hamilton who wrote in Federalist No. 22, for example, that “a fundamen-
tal maxim of republican government . . . requires that the sense of the majority should pre-
vail.” Id. at 763 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961)). 
116. Id. at 764 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 240-41 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). 
117. Balkin, supra note 114, at 1432. 
118. William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115, 
1118 (2011); see also ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMON-
WEALTH: LABOR AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 38-46 (2014) (em-
phasizing that republican freedom must be realized under conditions of equal liberty in the 
economic sphere); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: 
WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 3-5 (2017) (arguing that the U.S. 
Constitution assumes relative economic equality but that such equality is now absent); Joseph 
Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 670-71 
(2014) (urging that avoiding oligarchy and building a robust middle class are constitutional 
principles). 
119. While we focus on reforms to build countervailing political organization, we recognize that 
also important are reforms that would more equitably distribute economic power and 
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works to redistribute political power. In his Harvard Law Review Foreword, 
Daryl Levinson lays out four areas of public law that are concerned with “dis-
tributing power among political interests”: election law, judicial intervention on 
behalf of groups lacking political power, campaign-finance law, and anticapture 
judicial review (along with institutional design) in administrative and constitu-
tional law. 120  Although these areas are not designed to facilitate organizing 
among working-class voters, they all share an ambition of equalizing political 
power so as to correct for imbalances that would otherwise plague democratic 
participation.121 
For example, Levinson shows how parts of election law—or, the law of de-
mocracy—advance this goal. He explains that “the ideal of equalizing political 
power continues to serve as a normative touchstone in debates about how elec-
toral rules and institutional structures should be designed”122 and that “in at 
least one area of election law the goal of redistributing political power has always 
been front and center: the enfranchisement and political empowerment of pre-
viously excluded black voters.”123 To ensure that Black voters not only have the 
formal right to vote but are also “effective[ly] represent[ed],” the federal govern-
ment banned at-large election systems that diluted the power of Black minorities 
and also required the construction of majority-minority districts to empower 
these minorities actually to elect their desired representatives.124 Levinson also 
shows how judicial enforcement of constitutional rights to protect “politically 
powerless” groups, à la Carolene Products and political-process theory, is a second 
 
resources, including tax reform, antitrust reform, and banking and corporate-law reform. For 
some recent scholarly efforts to that end, see, for example, KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF 
CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 21-22 (2019); TIM WU, THE 
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 1-3 (2018); and Lily Batchelder & 
David Kamin, Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options 1 (Sept. 11, 2019) (unpublished manu-
script), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3452274 [https://perma.cc/G9M7-G9CX]. 
120. Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 38, 112 (2016) (arguing that structural constitutional law should be more 
attentive to power as it manifests in democratic-level interests, as opposed to the power of 
government institutions); cf. Kate Andrias, Response, Confronting Power in Public Law, 130 
HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2016) (critiquing Levinson for remaining agnostic on existing maldistri-
butions of power and for offering as a prescription only that “‘pockets of public law’ ought to 
be linked to one another and to structural constitutionalism ‘by a common concern with bal-
ancing and diffusing power’”). 
121. Levinson, supra note 120, at 113. 
122. Id. at 120. 
123. Id. at 124. 
124. See id. (quoting Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1363-65 
(1995)). 
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area where law redistributes political power.125 Indeed, the essence of the Caro-
lene Products footnote—and of political-process theory—is that certain groups 
lack an appropriate level of political power and that the law ought to step in to 
compensate for that absence. Thus, the Supreme Court has long held that a 
group’s political powerlessness is a relevant factor in determining whether that 
group qualifies as a suspect class and is therefore entitled to heightened judicial 
protection. As Levinson writes, 
In the first instance, the Carolene Products approach calls for courts to re-
arrange the democratic process in order to fully empower disenfran-
chised groups. Failing that, however, courts are then charged with repli-
cating the policy outcomes that would have resulted from an idealized 
process in which all groups exercised their fair share of power.126 
What we propose are legal interventions of a different sort but with the re-
lated goal of rebalancing political power in the direction of political equality. In 
essence, we suggest multiple ways that the law might enable low- and middle-
income people to build organizations with political power—organizations aim-
ing to increase the responsiveness of government to the policy preferences of 
low- and middle-income Americans, while at the same time shi�ing power rela-
tions between powerless individuals and powerful economic actors like employ-
ers, landlords, welfare agencies, and banks. These organizations would aggre-
gate the political voice and resources—financial and human—of their members. 
 
125. See id. at 129 & n.553 (discussing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938)). 
126. Levinson, supra note 120, at 129; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 713, 745 (1985) (“[I]f we are to remain faithful to Carolene’s concern with the 
fairness of pluralist politics, we must repudiate the bad political science that allows us to ig-
nore . . . victims of poverty and sexual discrimination who find it most difficult to protect their 
fundamental interests through effective political organization.”); Stephanopoulos, supra note 
101, at 1577-79 (describing studies showing group-based powerlessness for low-income 
Americans). On the role of campaign-finance law in equalizing political power, see Levinson, 
supra note 120, at 135-36. See also HASEN, supra note 13, at 7 (arguing that limiting money in 
politics “would be a reasonable step” toward “equality in political power”); David A. Strauss, 
What Is the Goal of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 158 (arguing that 
campaign-finance reform can be justified by “[t]he promotion of equality”). On administra-
tive law and institutional design, see Levinson, supra note 120, at 113-18. See also Rachel E. 
Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 
17 (2010) (addressing the “overlooked elements of agency design that are particularly well-
suited to addressing the problem of capture when interest groups line up on one side of an 
issue”); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264-66 (1987) (describing ways to 
enhance constituency voices in agency administration); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation 
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1760 (1975) (developing an account of 
“administrative law as interest representation”). 
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It is through such aggregation that these organizations would amass political 
power and could thereby serve as a counterweight to the political influence that 
flows from wealth. As Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers have explained, 
[I]nequalities in material advantage . . . translate directly to inequalities 
in political power. Groups can help remedy these inequalities by permit-
ting individuals with low per capita resources to pool those resources 
through organization. In making the benefits of organization available to 
those whose influence on policy is negligible without it, groups help to 
satisfy the norm of political equality.127 
The closest extant analogue to what we propose in this Article is federal labor 
law. As we have explained previously, “In the United States, the legal regime that 
has most successfully facilitated lower- and middle-class political organizing has 
been labor law.”128 Despite its many flaws, which we explore below, labor law 
has helped workers build powerful political organizations (i.e., labor unions) 
through several basic mechanisms. First, labor law explicitly grants workers the 
right to organize and strike, creating a “frame” for collective action. Second, la-
bor law has historically provided workers with a viable and sustainable organi-
zational funding mechanism by requiring employers to bargain over payroll-de-
duction systems, and it has provided workers access to some of the information 
necessary for organizing. Third, the law provides workers the right to use the 
workplace as a geographical site for organizing by, for example, granting em-
ployees the right to discuss unionization on company property and, in limited 
contexts, allowing nonemployee union organizers to do the same. Fourth, the 
law plays a critical role in facilitating organizing by promising to insulate work-
ers from employer retaliation.129 Fi�h, the law grants workers the collective right 
to bargain with employers over terms of employment, including their wages, 
hours and working conditions. Finally, once organized into unions, low- and 
middle-income workers are positioned to exercise collective political power 
through electoral and administrative channels—and also through collective di-
rect action and protest when those traditional channels fail.130 
 
127. Cohen & Rogers, supra note 20, at 424. 
128. Sachs, supra note 18, at 152; see also Andrias, Separations of Wealth, supra note 18, at 500 (dis-
cussing the importance of labor unions for low- and middle-income Americans). 
129. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 172-75. Of course, the statutory labor-law regime only needs to 
grant these rights because common law first grants employers near authoritarian control over 
workers while on employer property. The prior distribution of power is neither natural nor 
neutral. See infra notes 147-150. 
130. See supra notes 82-88; see also Alison D. Morantz, What Unions Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 515, 520 (2017) (discussing how “[u]nion involvement has helped secure the 
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To be sure, labor law has significant limitations, many of which we have 
highlighted in our own previous work: labor law excludes large numbers of 
workers, many of whom are women and people of color; it is characterized by 
weak enforcement mechanisms, leaving workers effectively unprotected from re-
taliation when they organize or engage in protests, strikes, or other collective 
activity; the law places multiple limitations on the form and content of the right 
to strike; and, although the law provides a right to bargain, it mandates that such 
bargaining occur only at the worksite level (as opposed to the sectoral or industry 
level, where power over working conditions is frequently exercised).131 
Despite these very real shortcomings, however, labor law has served as a crit-
ical legal mechanism for facilitating the growth of powerful, collective political 
organizations of working people. In this way, it has been an important tool for 
rebalancing political power between wealthy and nonwealthy citizens. The am-
bition of this Article is to suggest how law might do this for low- and middle-
income people more broadly and even more effectively. 
i i .  urgency and promise of a law of organizing 
Such a project is necessary because the democracy-reform proposals that 
have captured scholarly or political attention to date would do little to build 
countervailing social-movement organization among working-class and poor 
Americans. Instead, most scholars and advocates propose reforms to campaign-
finance and lobbying law, increasing the voting rights of individual citizens, and 
improving transparency in politics and government.132 While important, such 
proposals have limited capacity to create a more equal political economy. Limi-
tations on the ability of the wealthy to fund campaigns or lobbying, in particular, 
would require the Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine to be overruled 
by a new alignment on the Court or by constitutional amendment.133 Moreover, 
such reform faces significant practical hurdles. Money finds new channels when 
campaign-finance and lobbying regulators shut down one avenue; therefore, 
capping contributions or even expenditures is unlikely to have much effect.134 
 
passage of federal protective legislation in areas such as Occupational Safety & Health, fair 
labor standards, and equal employment opportunity” and has produced higher levels of reg-
ulatory compliance). 
131. See Andrias, supra note 26, at 33. 
132. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
134. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708-17 (1999) (arguing that money finds new channels when existing 
routes are closed off ); Kang, supra note 14, at 40 (detailing recent Court decisions and 
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Disclosure and transparency regimes, while valuable, have done little to coun-
terbalance wealth’s influence.135 
So, too, efforts to protect the right to vote at the individual level are essential. 
But participation through voting is only one small way in which citizens partic-
ipate in politics and governance. Likewise, making it easier for a diverse range of 
participants to lobby,136 or to engage in the regulatory process more broadly,137 
are worthy goals. But without greater organization, poor and working-class 
Americans are unlikely to engage their legislators or the administrative state ef-
fectively. 
Legal interventions designed to facilitate and increase the power of counter-
vailing mass-membership organizations are a necessary complement to 
 
describing “reverse hydraulics” whereby the Court rolled back campaign-finance law as it 
stood for decades and “political money has rushed back to newly deregulated channels like 
water finding its own level”); Sachs, supra note 18, at 165 & n.68 (discussing the limitations 
of lobbying reform). 
135. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass, Darkly: The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1443 (2014) (finding that “compli-
ance with existing disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to 
identify the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance system”). Proposals 
for expanded public financing or “democracy vouchers” are perhaps more promising, but they 
have yet to gain political traction, and, in any event, on their own, would be insufficient to 
counterbalance the power of wealth throughout the political system. See CAGÉ, supra note 18, 
at 253-323 (arguing for a public voucher system to give each voter an equal amount to spend 
in support of political parties, as a complement to other reforms); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUB-
LIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 266-70 (2011) (urging 
the use of “democracy vouchers”). 
136. In recent years, election-law scholars have increasingly turned their attention to lobbying law. 
E.g., Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELEC-
TION L.J. 160 (2014); Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1147, 1155, 1157 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the 
Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191 (2012); Zephyr Teachout, The Forgotten Law of Lobbying, 13 
ELECTION L.J. 4 (2014); cf. Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1131, 1132 (2016) (analyzing the history of the Petition Clause and “argu[ing] for a stronger 
petition right, especially a right to consideration and response”). 
137. For proposals to increase participation in the administrative state, see, for example, Nina A. 
Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1343, 1380 (2011); and Wendy Wagner, The Participation-Centered Model Meets Administrative 
Process, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 671, 677-78, 692. Cf. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 15-16 (Donald R. Harris, Keith 
Hawkins, Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Doreen McBarnet eds., 1992) (proposing regulatory regimes 
more responsive to industry and consumer associations); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the 
Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012) 
(analyzing the ways in which federal spending programs promote the robust participation 
and inclusion of varied groups to further civil-rights norms); Charles F. Sabel & William H. 
Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 56 (2011) 
(analyzing minimalist and experimentalist models of public intervention). 
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proposals that have thus far dominated reform debates. Organizations permit 
low- and middle-income individuals to pool resources and speak with a stronger 
voice.138 Organizations can turn out voters, involve citizens in lobbying, and in-
fluence public debate.139 They can also help shape regulatory agendas, comment 
on proposed rules, press for agency-enforcement activity, and navigate the com-
plicated and fragmented processes of government. When political organizations 
are membership groups, rather than professionally managed “check-book” or-
ganizations, their participation helps facilitate more equal political involvement, 
while giving Americans a chance to practice democracy on a more regular ba-
sis.140 
Historians have illuminated the instrumental role mass-membership organ-
izations played in the passage of a host of legislation—including labor legisla-
tion, the GI bill, and civil-rights legislation—even in the face of staunch opposi-
tion from elites.141 Social-movement theorists and legal scholars of movements 
have likewise demonstrated the critical role that movement organizations played 
in winning changes in law and policy.142 Recent quantitative empirical work 
supports the conclusion that organization is essential to achieving a more equi-
table democracy. As we have noted, Gilens finds an exception to the general rule 
that policymakers are far more responsive to the preferences of the wealthy: 
where countervailing interest-group power is exerted, government policy no 
longer simply tracks the preferences of the wealthy.143 Rather, on issues where 
 
138. See Cohen & Rogers, supra note 20, at 424; see also Clause Offe, Some Skeptical Considerations 
on the Malleability of Representative Institutions, in ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 114, 126-27 
(Erik Olin Wright ed., 1995) (describing the conventional view of associative action and in-
terest-group formation); JOHN D. STEPHENS, THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIAL-
ISM 49-50 (Michael Mann ed., 1980) (discussing the importance of labor unions and other 
organizations in strengthening the welfare state and facilitating movement from capitalism to 
socialism); David Bradley, Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, François Neilsen & John D. Ste-
phens, Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies, 55 WORLD POL. 193, 197 
(2003) (“Organization in unions results in a shi� of power in the market toward the union 
members.”). 
139. See Sachs, supra note 18, at 152, 157, 169. 
140. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
141. For a few examples from the rich historical literature, see LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 69, at 122-
28, which discusses the role of labor unions in enacting wage legislation; GARY MAY, BENDING 
TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY (2013), which describes the role of Civil Rights movement in the passage of the Vot-
ing Rights Act; and METTLER, supra note 65, at 18-22, which details the role of the American 
Legion in the passage of the GI Bill. See also BRANCH, supra note 75 (providing an account of 
the role played by civil-rights mass-movement organizations in enacting legislative change). 
142. See infra Part III (collecting and analyzing sociology literature); supra notes 28-31 (citing legal 
literature on social movements). 
143. See GILENS, supra note 11, at 121-22, 157-58. 
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organized groups advance the preferences of low- and middle-income Ameri-
cans, government outcomes more o�en correspond to the preferences of low- 
and middle-income Americans.144 Consistent with these findings, the state and 
local governments that have been most active in attempting to redress wealth 
inequality of late are those operating in regions with higher levels of organization 
among working people.145 
The legal literature frequently treats the paucity of collective organization 
among nonelites as an inevitable collective-action problem, a natural occur-
rence.146 In reality, however, the lack of organization among low- and middle-
income Americans—along with the strength of organization among elites—is, in 
part, a product of law. As Lauren Edelman and Mark Suchman have written, 
“[O]rganizations are not ‘real’ primordial creatures, but are social constructions, 
defined and given meaning in large part by legal institutions.”147 Legal forms 
sometimes directly influence organizational behavior and performance.148 On 
other occasions, law shapes organizational practices less directly, by contributing 
to an underlying cultural logic of “legal-rationality.”149 As legal realists, critical 
legal scholars, and, more recently, the burgeoning Law and Political Economy 
movement, have pointed out, law constructs economic and political power.150 
 
144. For example, Martin Gilens found that unions are among the most important forces moving 
policy in a direction desired by the less well-off. Id. at 158. 
145. See supra notes 85-87 (collecting political-science research on unions and governmental re-
sponsiveness). 
146. See notes 231-232 and accompanying text; cf. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized 
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284-91 (2006) (discussing the 
history of capture theory in administrative law). Meanwhile, the leading scholarship on the 
shape of civil society focuses little attention on the role of law, instead examining how factors 
such as technology and evolving cultural norms have eroded connections among Americans, 
making them less likely to join organizations. See, e.g., MARC J. DUNKELMAN, THE VANISHING 
NEIGHBOR: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 3-78 (2014); ROBERT D. PUT-
MAN, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 183-286 
(2000). 
147. Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 479, 504 (1997) (paraphrasing W. Richard Scott, Law and Organizations, in THE 
LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION 3, 12 (Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies eds., 1994)). 
148. Id. (first citing Heather A. Haveman, Organizational Size and Change: Diversification in the Sav-
ings and Loan Industry A�er Deregulation, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 20, 35-36 (1993); and then citing 
Hayagreeva Rao & Eric H. Neilsen, An Ecology of Agency Arrangements: Mortality of Savings and 
Loan Associations, 1960-1987, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 448, 448 (1992)). 
149. Id. (citing MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 329-41 (A.M. 
Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., The Free Press 1968) (1947)). 
150. For just a few examples of these insights from the legal realists, see Morris R. Cohen, The 
Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 568-70 (1933), which argues that, because of 
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So, too, the landscape of organizational life—and the rights and power wielded 
by different organizations—are neither natural nor neutral. 
Thus, law has played a critical role in constructing the modern corpora-
tion;151 in shaping the boundaries between private firms, public agencies, col-
lective enterprises, and nonprofit organizations; 152  in empowering and con-
straining the modern trade union;153 and in enabling some forms of economic 
coordination, while disabling others under antitrust law.154 Ultimately, it is a 
 
background economic and social conditions, formal freedom of contract did not reflect a truly 
free choice. See also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472, 478 (1923) (“To take this control by law from the owner of the plant 
and to vest it in public officials or in a guild or in a union organization elected by the workers 
would neither add to nor subtract from the constraint which is exercised with the aid of the 
government. It would merely transfer the constraining power to a different set of persons.”). 
From the subsequent generation of critical legal scholars, see, for example, Hanoch Dagan, 
The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 660 (2007), which emphasizes, as law’s 
most significant feature, “its difficult, but inevitable, accommodation of power and reason”; 
and Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Com-
modities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 958-68 (1985), which critiques the standard treatment of law 
in neoclassical microeconomic theory. See also Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market 
Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1988) (“[A]ll markets 
are based on and constituted by a structure of legal rules . . . [which] are intimately involved 
in shaping substantive outcomes, and therefore the distributive results of all bargaining pro-
cesses.”). And from the newly revived field of Law and Political Economy, see Jedediah Brit-
ton-Purdy, Amy Kapczynski & David Singh Grewal, Law and Political Economy: Toward a Man-
ifesto, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Nov. 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/06/law-and-
political-economy-toward-a-manifesto [https://perma.cc/AEU5-HHBV]. 
151. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE 
POSSIBILITIES 30, 35, 41 (2007) (critiquing the dominant view that corporate law is private law, 
defined by agency relationships and contracts). 
152. John L. Campbell & Leon N. Lindberg, Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity 
by the State, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 634, 634-35 (1990); Edelman & Suchman, supra note 147, at 504 
(first citing Victor Nee, Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property 
Rights, and Mixed Economy in China, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 2 (1992); and then citing HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 3-5 (2000)). 
153. See Andrias, supra note 26, at 36-40; Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 
114 MICH. L. REV. 169, 169 (2015). 
154. Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV.  378, 380 (2020). 
As Katharina Pistor has recently detailed, under our current system, the legal construction of 
organization tends to benefit capital. Capital is coded “in institutions of private law, including 
property, collateral, trust, corporate, bankruptcy law, and contract law . . . [all of which] be-
stow critical legal attributes on the select assets that give them a comparative advantage over 
others in creating new and protecting old wealth.” PISTOR, supra note 119, at 21. 
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matter of political choice which organizations deserve status, protection, and 
rights under law.155 
In circumstances when the political choice has been to facilitate poor and 
working people’s organizations, that choice has had effect. Indeed, recent empir-
ical work on constitutions suggests that protecting organizational rights, includ-
ing the right to form labor unions and political parties, has greater effect than 
granting individual rights because such organizations have both incentives and 
means to protect substantive rights.156 The labor context in particular provides 
numerous examples of how law can further organization building. For example, 
in the five months following congressional recognition of the right to organize 
in the 1933 National Industrial Recovery Act, 1.5 million workers joined unions, 
an increase described by one scholar of the period as “dramatic.”157 In just six 
years following the enactment of the NLRA in 1935, more than six million work-
ers organized,158 a massive increase from the earlier period in which law pun-
ished collective action among workers rather than facilitating it.159 The subse-
quent passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)—which in its initial form 
gave unions a privileged position in negotiating wage minimums on an indus-
try-by-industry basis and empowered them to bring collective actions against 
wage violations—further buoyed organizing among workers. 160  And during 
World War II, the tripartite War Labor Board, which afforded labor a relatively 
unprecedented role in setting national labor and employment policy, along with 
pro-union decisions from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), helped 
 
155. See PISTOR, supra note 119, at 21; cf. Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in 
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 413, 418 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990) (ex-
plaining that people tend to perceive legal prescriptions as “natural and necessary” or, at least, 
as “basically uncontroversial, neutral, acceptable”). 
156. Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?, 60 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 575, 583 (2016) (explaining that the distinctive feature of organizational rights is that they 
aid the establishment of organizations that have the incentives and means to safeguard rights 
as well as the means to act strategically to protect them from government repression). 
157. PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA 421 (2010). 
158. See MAYER, supra note 89, at 23 tbl.A1. 
159. On the use of courts against labor, see WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE 
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991). To be clear, our claim is not that law was the only, or 
even the primary, factor driving the rise and fall of unionization over the course of the twen-
tieth century. As one of us has detailed in prior work, and as numerous scholars have docu-
mented, the legal regime was but one of multiple factors playing a role in the rise and fall of 
unions. See Andrias, supra note 26, at 13-46. 
160. Andrias, supra note 67, at 667. 
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produce an explosion in union density, with the number of workers in unions 
growing from nine to fi�een million over the course of World War II.161 
Conversely, the passage of the Ta�-Hartley Act, which significantly con-
strained union rights, the repeal of the FLSA industry committees, and numer-
ous subsequent doctrinal developments narrowing labor rights, correlate with a 
decline in union organization.162 In particular, the Ta�-Hartley Act altered fed-
eral policy so that it no longer expressly favored workers’ collective rights, in-
stead balancing those rights with employees’ “full freedom” to refrain from en-
gaging in union activity. 163  Moreover, the Act codified employers’ right to 
campaign against unionization, permitted individual states to pass “right to 
work” laws banning union-security agreements, and limited workers’ ability to 
exercise power over the economy by forbidding unions from engaging in sec-
ondary boycotts.164 Though scholars disagree on the extent to which Ta�-Hart-
ley was a turning point or a codification of preexisting court precedent, little dis-
agreement exists that the statutory amendments weakened labor unions, the 
social-movement organizations that prior law had previously helped facilitate.165 
 
161. See JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, “IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION”: THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
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J. LAB. & EMP. L. 375, 375 (1999) (reviewing JAMES B. ATLESON, LABOR AND THE WARTIME 
STATE (1998)); Steve Fraser, The Good War and the Workers, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 20, 2009), 
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(1998). Although beyond the scope here, comparative analysis provides further support for 
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workers. For example, French law expressly recognizes and empowers a range of “representa-
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and tenants associations. See Edith Archambault, Historical Roots of the Nonprofit Sector in 
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2019), https://www.service-public.fr/associations/vosdroits/F1218 [https://perma.cc/A95R-
Z5EL]; Associations de Parents D’élèves, SERV.-PUB.FR (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.service-
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Law thus matters to the possibility of organizing for countervailing power. 
But the question remains, what would a legal regime explicitly designed to facil-
itate organizing by the poor and working class in contexts beyond labor look 
like? We offer ways to approach that question in the next Part, and to animate 
the analysis to come, we conclude this Part with a thought experiment—by im-
agining what a law designed to facilitate organizing would look like in a real-
world context. For these purposes, consider housing. Today, when local zoning 
commissions, city councils, state legislatures, state and federal agencies, and 
Congress discuss housing policy, real-estate developers and landlords spend mil-
lions on lobbying.166 Affluent, single-family home owners turn out in force.167 
The mortgage and construction industries are typically active as well.168 But Sec-
tion 8 recipients, poor renters, and the homeless—a group that is growing again 
a�er a decade of decline169—rarely participate equally in the discussion, let alone 
exercise significant influence over decisionmaking. 170  Meanwhile, rents and 
home purchase prices are rising much faster than income, with the median home 
 
public.fr/associations/vosdroits/F1390 [https://perma.cc/F7VC-4GMX]; Associations Recon-
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& Tenant Act 1985, c. 70, § 29; Housing and Planning Act 2016, c. 22, § 29A; Welcome to Berlin 
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terned on the labor code. See Finn Makela & Sophie Audette-Chapdelaine, The Legal 
Regulation of University Student Associations in Canada, 22 EDUC. & L.J. 267, 287-91 (2013). 
166. See Agency Profile: Dept of Housing & Urban Development, OPENSECRETS, https://www.open-
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167. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air: Transferable 
Development Rights and “Constituency Effects” in Land Use Law, 12 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 79, 80 (de-
scribing the political economy of housing policy). 
168. For data on lobbying by these industries, see Construction: Lobbying, 2020, OPENSECRETS, 
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169.  The State of Homelessness in America, NAT’L ALLIANCE END HOMELESSNESS, https://endhome-
lessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report
-legacy [https://perma.cc/LR8Y-CYWJ]. 
170. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 167, at 80-81; cf. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY 
AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016) (following families in Milwaukee as they struggle 
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price in some 200 cities approaching $1 million and “almost half of all renters 
pa[ying] more than 30 percent of their income in rent.”171 
In numerous cities and states, faced with unaffordable rents and substandard 
housing, tenants are organizing.172 Indeed, in response to mass unemployment 
and economic distress resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, tenant groups 
have organized numerous protests and rent strikes, while also pushing for new 
laws that commit funds to housing construction and restrict the unfettered abil-
ity of landlords to raise rents.173 But the groups are typically local, they struggle 
for funding, and they are most active in a few urban centers like Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, and New York.174 In many areas of the country, particularly in 
suburbs and rural communities, there is little organization among tenants or the 
homeless, and there is no legal infrastructure for their mobilization and political 
success. 
Imagine, then, a new law of tenants’ unions that would foster incipient or-
ganizing. What should such a law look like? The discussion below suggests that 
the law should explicitly convey that substandard and unaffordable housing is 
an injustice and that tenants have a collective right to organize to achieve fair hous-
ing for all. The legal regime should guarantee safe spaces in which tenants and 
organizers could meet and discuss concerns about their housing conditions; give 
organizers the right to access properties to engage tenants in organizing; and 
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bias, supra note 35. 
173. See Samuel Stein, Tenants Won This Round, JACOBIN (June 18, 2019), https://www.jacobin-
mag.com/2019/06/new-york-housing-tenants-universal-rent-control [https://perma.cc
/DPQ7-KM7N]. 
174. See, e.g., Who We Are, HOUSING JUST. FOR ALL, https://www.housingjusticeforall.org/who-
we-are-1 [https://perma.cc/X5DS-STSZ]; see also Jimmy Tobias, A New Housing-Rights 
Movement Has the Real-Estate Industry Running Scared, NATION (Feb. 9, 2018), 
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provide organizers with information, such as tenants’ names and contact infor-
mation, as well as information about the housing market. As important, the law 
should create new mechanisms to fund tenant organizations, supplementing char-
itable donations with a dues system paid through rent check-off and subsidies 
from the government and landlords themselves. It should provide resources to 
train tenant leaders and allow them leave from their jobs so they could engage 
in housing organizing and policy work. It should allow tenants to bargain collec-
tively with their landlords about problems in their buildings, while also giving 
tenant organizations a seat at the table during administrative processes regarding 
housing policy. By creating federated organizations, the tenant organizations 
could develop sufficient power to challenge local, national, and multinational 
corporate entities that influence housing policy. 
Such organizations could also deploy their newly developed political power 
in ways that go beyond the particular issues around which they formed: just as 
labor unions speak across a range of policy questions broader than “labor” issues, 
tenants’ unions could as well, using their resources to further broader-based po-
litical organizing. The law should protect such “bargaining for the common 
good.”175 It also should guarantee the right to protest and to strike, free from 
retaliation by the government or the private landlord.176 
To be sure, this legal regime would not spontaneously or inevitably create 
robust social-movement organizations with political power at the local, state, 
and federal level. Many factors beyond the reach of law influence the ability of 
social-movement organizations to form and to thrive, including political oppor-
tunities, underlying economic trends, leadership capacity, and the commitment 
and energy of individual organizers.177 But law matters, and in the next Part we 
suggest a host of ways in which law can be structured to facilitate organizing for 
countervailing power. 
i i i .  factors and facilitators 
Having illustrated in the last Part the importance of stronger countervailing 
social-movement organizations and the plausibility of legal intervention to en-
courage their growth, in this Part, we show how law can facilitate organization 
 
175. See Joseph A. McCartin, Bargaining for the Common Good, DISSENT (Spring 2016), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/bargaining-common-good-community-union-
alignment [https://perma.cc/28YW-PXRY]. 
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177. See supra notes 41-42; see also McAdam, supra note 40, at 24-25 (describing the concept of 
“political opportunities”). 
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in contexts that are populated by low- and middle-income Americans and rife 
with exploitation and power imbalances. To do so, we draw from the social-sci-
ence literature, as well as from the experiences of labor law, to offer a more nu-
anced and theoretically grounded picture of how a different set of legal choices 
could help facilitate conditions critical to organizing success. We undertake this 
analysis with the recognition that while this literature is revealing and sugges-
tive, it does not aspire to be firmly predictive.178 We begin, in other words, with 
the premise of Saul Alinsky’s seminal work on organizing theory: “At no time in 
any discussion or analysis of mass movements, tactics, or any other phase of the 
problem, can it be said that if this is done then that will result. The most we can 
hope to achieve is an understanding of the probabilities consequent to certain 
actions.”179 In this spirit, the discussion that follows aims to illuminate a series 
of legal interventions that would make organizing by the poor and working class 
more probable even if not certain. 
A. Framing 
A prominent strand in the social-movement literature stresses the im-
portance of a symbolic or social-psychological requisite for successful collective 
action.180 Put simply, this school of thought is concerned with understanding 
the cognitive work that goes into translating the raw “events or occurrences” of 
everyday life into issues around which people organize collectively.181 This body 
of work thus examines the role played by “collective action frames,” which are 
“action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the ac-
tivities and campaigns of a social movement organization.”182 
Although the framing literature is now vast, the leading work in the field can 
be productively condensed by focusing on four core aspects—or “tasks”—of col-
lective-action frames: diagnostic framing (which involves both problem 
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ment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464, 464 
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identification and blame attribution and which is alternatively named “injustice” 
framing in the literature); prognostic framing (which involves developing a po-
tential collective approach to addressing the identified problem); motivational or 
agency framing (through which the collective efficacy of the group to carry out 
the approach is implied); and identity framing (in which the collective identity 
of the group that will carry out the approach is developed).183 Taken as a whole, 
the literature suggests that successful political organizing is enabled by collec-
tive-action frames that diagnose injustices, suggest collective solutions, motivate 
collective responses, and generate collective identity. In this Section, we review 
each of these four core framing tasks and then move to discuss ways in which 
law might be deployed to facilitate each of them. 
According to Robert Benford and David Snow, the first thing a collective-
action frame must do if it is to enable collective action is help potential-move-
ment participants diagnose some set of conditions as a problem that ought to be 
remedied, rather than as a set of conditions that, although undesirable, is a nat-
ural, perhaps unavoidable part of life.184 For William Gamson, such diagnostic 
work in the context of political action and mobilization necessarily involves di-
agnosing a set of conditions as an injustice.185 This is critical because injustice, 
unlike a mere problem, brings forth what Gamson calls “hot cognition, not 
merely an abstract intellectual judgment about what is equitable,” but “righteous 
anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul.”186 For both sets of authors, 
problem identification is not enough: diagnosis must also involve blame attrib-
ution. In Benford and Snow’s words, “[s]ince social movements seek to remedy 
or alter some problematic situation or issue, it follows that directed action is con-
tingent on identification of the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable 
agents.”187 For Gamson, “[a]n injustice frame requires a consciousness of moti-
vated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and 
suffering.”188 
Gamson, moreover, usefully distinguishes between different types of agents 
that might be blamed for the injustice diagnosed in a collective-action frame. At 
one end of the spectrum lie abstract, structural forces like the economic system, 
the political order, and the government. At the other end of the spectrum are 
individual human actors like a particular manager or landlord. Blaming an ab-
straction like the market or the political system risks diffusing the “indignation” 
 
183. See infra notes 185-200 and accompanying text. 
184. See Benford & Snow, supra note 182, at 615-16. 
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that Gamson finds essential to successful diagnostic framing. On the other hand, 
blaming particular agents risks shi�ing attention from structural forces that are 
legitimately responsible for people’s suffering. Thus, Gamson concludes that 
frames, to facilitate collective action, must work to attribute blame somewhere 
between broad, abstract structural forces and discrete human actors. As he 
writes: 
  To sustain collective action, the targets identified by the frame must 
successfully bridge abstract and concrete. By connecting broader socio-
cultural forces with human agents who are appropriate targets of collec-
tive action, one can get the heat into the cognition. By making sure that 
the concrete targets are linked to and can affect the broader forces, one 
can make sure that the heat isn’t misdirected in ways that will leave the 
underlying source of injustice untouched.189 
So, perhaps, the injustice of low wages is laid at the feet of neither capitalism 
nor the factory superintendent, but the corporation that controls the employ-
ment relationship or even the corporations that make up the relevant economic 
sector. And the injustice of high rent and poor living conditions is laid at the feet 
of neither the market nor a particular building owner, but the landlords who 
have undue influence at the city council and state legislature. 
Once an injustice is identified, and blame properly attributed, a successful 
collective-action frame then must identify and communicate an approach to 
remedying the injustice: it must, according to Benford and Snow, “articu-
lat[e] . . . a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the 
strategies for carrying out the plan.”190 Importantly, although there must be a 
connection between prognosis and diagnosis—how to address a problem de-
pends on the nature of the problem to be addressed—the articulation of injustice 
and attribution of blame narrows but does not determine how to address the 
injustice.191 This point may be obvious, but it is worth noting. Take the injustice 
of low wages in the fast-food industry as attributed to the five largest corpora-
tions controlling that industry. A range of approaches to remedying the injustice 
are plausible. Workers might, for example, sue the corporations under wage-
and-hour laws, picket their restaurants as a means of pressuring the corpora-
tions, or organize into unions and attempt to bargain collectively wage increases. 
Any of these approaches would constitute a plausible approach to the injustice. 
The prognostic work of a collective-action frame involves articulating one or 
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more of these approaches: this allows participants to formulate a viable plan of 
attack. 
The first two framing tasks—diagnostic and prognostic—involve cognitive 
work about dynamics external to the mobilizing group: what is the injustice and 
who is causing it. The second two tasks—motivational and identity—involve 
cognitive work internal to the mobilizing group. This is work focused on bring-
ing participants into motion and struggle, in an effort to build a collective iden-
tity. For Benford and Snow, motivational framing involves a call to action, the 
“construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive” that provide prods to action 
by, among other things, overcoming both the fear of the risks o�en associated 
with collective action and Olson’s vaunted free-rider problem.192 Gamson, who 
names this framing task “agency,” describes its function in terms of efficacy. 
Thus, to fulfill the agency task, a collective-action frame must give participants 
a sense both that they are capable of redressing the injustice in question and that 
their opposition is vulnerable to challenge. The frame must imply that “it is pos-
sible to alter conditions or policies through collective action” and must “deny the 
immutability of some undesirable situation.”193 In even simpler terms, the mo-
tivational task involves a communication to potential participants that “we can 
do this.” 
As the above suggests, however, there remains a final task for the frame: de-
fining, or creating, the “we” that can successfully act collectively against the ar-
ticulated injustice. Gamson names this framing task “identity”: the process by 
which a collective identity among movement participants is constructed.194 In-
deed, in stressing the importance of this kind of collective identity, this aspect of 
framing theory is resonant with other strands of social-movement theory which 
are centered around the observation that successful movement building and mo-
bilization are enabled by the existence of a collective identity among movement 
participants. For example, Bert Klandermans, a leading scholar of identity and 
movement participation, writes that “[t]he basic hypothesis regarding collective 
identity and movement participation is fairly straightforward: a strong identifi-
cation with a group makes participation in collective political action on behalf of 
that group more likely.”195 
Here, the identity-construction task of a collective-action frame is connected 
closely to the blame-attribution task. As Gamson explains, in the political 
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context, collective identities are o�en oppositional: the “we” exists in opposition 
to a “they,” where “they” are the agents responsible for the injustice.196 Thus, if 
the injustice of low wages paid to fast-food workers is attributed to a particular 
manager, the “we” who can fight that injustice will be a narrow group, probably 
just those impacted by this particular manager’s actions. On the other hand, if 
low wages are attributed to the five largest corporations in the fast-food industry, 
the “we” can be all fast-food workers. 
This is not to imply that collective identity flows ineluctably from successful 
blame attribution. However, collective-action frames can contribute to collec-
tive-identity construction, not only by identifying an oppositional “they,” but 
also by increasing the salience of certain aspects of potential participants’ identi-
ties. Because identities “exist in a hierarchy of salience,” the more salient an as-
pect of identity is, the more likely it is that the individual will act in accordance 
with that identity.197 For example, all individuals who live in a certain neighbor-
hood will share a collective identity of neighborhood resident. This identity may 
remain largely irrelevant for much of an individual’s life and never form the basis 
for action of any kind. But, as Klandermans teaches, if the government con-
structs a waste-disposal plant in the neighborhood, “[c]hances are that within a 
very short time the collective identity of the people living in that neighborhood 
becomes salient.”198 Finally, we know from Bernd Simon’s work that a shared 
sense of unjust treatment can increase the salience of a collective identity that is 
the basis of that unjust treatment.199 For example, racial- and religious-based 
discrimination has functioned throughout history to increase the salience of col-
lective identities based around racial- and religious-group membership. 200 
Thus, by framing certain events or occurrences as injustices, a frame can increase 
the salience of a collective identity built around the shared experience of that 
injustice. Framing low wages in the fast-food industry as an injustice suffered by 
all fast-food workers can contribute to the activation of a collective identity 
among fast-food workers. Framing high rents as an injustice suffered by tenants 
in a city can activate a collective identity of city tenants. 
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In sum, then, theorists posit that successful collective action can be enabled 
by collective-action frames that accomplish four interrelated tasks: they diag-
nose an injustice and attribute blame for it; they elaborate a means of remedying 
the injustice; they motivate participants to fight for that remedy; and they help 
activate the identity of the collective who will do the fighting. As some social-
movement theorists recognize, moreover, law has the capacity to serve as a pow-
erful collective-action frame. Indeed, civil-rights law is o�en identified in the 
social-movement literature as a “master frame”—a frame that “resonate[s] 
deeply across social movements and protest cycles.”201 In the workplace-rights 
context, legal scholar Jennifer Gordon describes the powerful way that rights 
have served as a collective-action frame: 
The idea that employers were supposed to be acting differently—that in 
paying so little and demanding so much they were ignoring a set of es-
tablished norms, codified as rights—suggested a less individualized, 
more systemic explanation of the problems immigrant[] [workers] faced 
in trying to earn enough money to support themselves and their fami-
lies. . . . If the problem was systemic, immigrant[] [workers] would 
need to respond in kind.202 
And workplace statutes can also fulfill the diagnostic and prognostic work of 
collective-action framing.203 
But how might we tailor legal interventions in a manner designed to enable 
laws to serve as collective-action frames more generally? We think the ideal way 
to do so is as follows: couple statutory provisions of substantive standards with 
the right to organize collectively to enforce those standards and to achieve greater 
substantive protections in the future. For purposes of this discussion, imagine a 
statute that affirmed a right to adequate and sustainable housing, granted ten-
ants the right to just-cause eviction, and also granted tenants a right to organize 
unions.204 The organizing right would include, among other things, the right of 
organizers to access tenant contact information; the right of organizers to come 
onto building property to speak to tenants and a free building space for the ten-
ants’ union to meet; a robust antiretaliation guarantee; an obligation for the 
 
201. Pedriana, supra note 40, at 1725. 
202. GORDON, supra note 30, at 171-72. 
203. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2723-25 
(2008). 
204. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 248 (showing how housing movements are constructing “the 
human right to housing in American law by establishing through private and local laws a right 
to remain, a right to adequate and sustainable shelter, a right to housing in a location that 
preserves cultural heritage, a right to a self-determined community, and a right to equal hous-
ing opportunities for nonproperty owners”). 
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building owner (or other relevant economic actor, such as real-estate investment 
trusts) to bargain with a union once it was formed; and the right of the union to 
a seat at the table in administrative processes regarding housing policy. Such a 
statute has the potential to fulfill all four framing tasks. 
With respect to diagnosis, the statute would clearly identify an injustice and 
attribute blame: by banning evictions without cause, the law identifies such evic-
tions as unjust; by making building owners liable for damages, the law attributes 
blame to the owners. Thus, the provision of right and remedy might in them-
selves accomplish the diagnostic-framing task. But the law could go much fur-
ther in the direction of diagnostic framing. For example, in the legislative find-
ings or statement of purpose, the law could explicitly identify evictions without 
cause as an injustice by detailing the harms such evictions cause to families. The 
law might also name evictions without cause as one example of a broader injus-
tice, namely the power of landlords unchecked by the collective strength of ten-
ants. In either case, the findings and purposes can list the unjust benefits that 
building owners extract from without-cause evictions and can directly name 
owners as the source of the problem. They could go on to detail other deleterious 
consequences that flow from unchecked landlord discretion. 
Crucially, given its status as a powerful source of social and political legiti-
macy, the law can offer convincing diagnoses.205 As a complement to diagnoses 
made by tenant organizers themselves, a statutory pronouncement that evictions 
without cause are illegal and that building owners are legally liable for violating 
this norm provides an additional source of diagnosis, and one that many tenants 
would likely credit. These suggestions, moreover, are not at all unprecedented. 
For example, when Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, it identified an 
injustice and attributed blame explicitly in the statute. Thus, 29 U.S.C. § 151 
states that “[t]he denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize 
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargain-
ing” had the effect of, inter alia, “depressing wage rates and the purchasing 
power of wage earners.” 
With respect to prognosis, the statutory grant of organizing rights would 
articulate for potential participants a viable plan of attack. Here, again, the grant 
of rights itself might be sufficient. A law that marries a substantive right with a 
protected right to engage in collective action communicates that organizing is a 
means of remedying the injustice identified in the statute. Again, too, the law 
might go further in the direction of accomplishing the framing task. In particu-
lar, the findings and statement of purpose could identify the legislature’s faith in 
 
205. See generally Pedriana, supra note 40, at 1726 (explaining how legal rights have a “powerful 
impact on how grievances and objectives are conceived, legitimized and acted upon in the 
American political system”). 
the yale law journal 130:546  2021 
594 
the power of collective action as a means of carrying out its legislative goals. In 
our hypothetical statute, this might include a statement that substantive stand-
ards—the right to just-cause evictions—are generally best enforced when the 
protected class is organized collectively. More broadly, the findings and purposes 
section of the law might state that organizing would balance bargaining power 
between landlords and tenants and thus enable tenants to accomplish important 
goals beyond the protection of just-cause eviction. Here, again, there is historical 
precedent for law fulfilling the task of prognostic framing. Having articulated 
injustice and attributed blame, the Wagner Act’s findings section moves on to 
set out a viable plan of attack for workers. Thus, § 151 states: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to . . . en-
courag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro-
tecting the exercise of workers of full freedom of association, self-organ-
ization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the 
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or 
other mutual aid or protection. 
Our hypothetical statute can also perform the task of motivational framing. 
As the above discussion reveals, the task involves a combination of “prodding” 
participants into action, helping them overcome fears related to participation, 
and convincing them of their efficacy in combating the named injustice. With 
respect to motivating action, our statute signifies legal legitimation of and thus 
legal support for the tenants’ effort to organize unions in order to better their 
housing conditions. Such legitimation can motivate subsequent organizing ef-
forts. For example, labor organizers successfully used congressional protection 
for the right to organize as a call to action. Thus, John L. Lewis famously trans-
lated legal protection for the right to organize into a slogan that was instrumental 
to the massive campaign of the United Mine Workers of America to unionize the 
coal mines, “The President wants you to join a union.”206 Our statute also can 
help overcome fears of participation by offering robust antiretaliation provi-
sions, including significant damages for violations. And the statute can contrib-
ute to the interrelated goals of demonstrating the oppositions’ vulnerability and 
participants’ efficacy. The existence of the statutory right coupled with meaning-
ful remedies is a step in the direction of establishing that landlords are vulnerable 
to challenge. And, as discussed above, the grant of access rights to organizers 
strengthens this function of the law. 
Finally, the hypothetical statute can contribute to the construction—or acti-
vation—of a collective identity. By making landlords legally liable for evictions 
 
206. See, e.g., Nelson Lichtenstein, Workers’ Rights Are Civil Rights: How to Put the Labor Movement 
Back at the Center of American Political Culture, WORKINGUSA, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 57, 59. 
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without cause, and by granting tenants organizing rights, the statute establishes 
a “we” and a “they.” “We” are the tenants protected by the statute; “they” are the 
landlords governed by it. Of course, much of the identity-activation work will 
occur—if it does—as a product of organizing and struggle that the statute might 
itself facilitate. As tenants begin to exercise the collective rights that the statute 
provides and engage in contestation with their landlords, it is likely that the col-
lective identity of “tenant” will become more salient. The statute’s contribution 
to this work should not be underestimated. 
The hypothetical tenant-organizing statute imagined here would, of course, 
have analogues in multiple contexts. In the labor context, it would involve grant-
ing both new substantive standards—say, a just-cause dismissal guarantee—
coupled with more robust protections for organizing than exist under current 
law. In the debtor context, it might involve a substantive right—cancellation of 
student debt—combined with a new explicit right to organize a debtor’s union. 
A broader observation is in order before moving on. The ability of a law like 
this to accomplish the four core framing tasks is enhanced by the law’s explicit-
ness. Coupling the grant of a substantive right with explicit protection for collec-
tive action makes clear the law’s determination that participants ought to organ-
ize to fight the injustice that the law condemns. Statutory findings and 
statements of purpose that name injustices and identify blameworthy agents 
make it even more likely that the law will effectively provide a diagnostic frame. 
So too, explicit legislative expression of support for organizing as a means of 
addressing injustice will increase the effectiveness of the law as a prognostic 
frame. 
B. Resources 
While the foregoing accounts of mobilization and organization stress sym-
bolic factors, the literature suggests that resources of various kinds are equally 
important. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, for example, argue that tradi-
tionally powerless groups have capacity to sustain movement activity only if they 
are able to aggregate resources through social-movement organizations. 207 
 
207. See McCarthy & Zald, supra note 46, at 1216; John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, The Trend 
of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization (Univ. of Mich. 
Ctr. for Research on Soc. Org., Working Paper No. 164, 1973), https://deepblue.lib
.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/50939/164.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WL8-P487]; see 
also Bob Edwards & John D. McCarthy, Resources and Social Movement Mobilization, in THE 
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 195, at 116, 142 (describing the 
dynamic, sometimes reciprocal, process of resources supporting collective action which, in 
turn, builds more resources); Mayer N. Zald, Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on 
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Resources enable movements to form and then to engage in effective political 
action and protest.208 They help movements “convert[] adherents into constitu-
ents and maintain[] constituent involvement.”209 Constituents, in turn, create 
more resources for the movement.210 Ultimately, resource aggregation is critical 
to the ability of movements to persist over time.211 Daniel M. Cress and David 
A. Snow have observed that “fluctuation in the level of discretionary resources 
accounts . . . for variation in the activity levels of social movements.”212 Sarah 
Soule, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Yang Su have found that resources 
matter more for movement formation and collective protest than numerous 
other factors, including political opportunities.213 
Empirical work demonstrating the importance of resources cuts across pop-
ulations, time periods, and geography.214 To take just a few examples, sociolo-
gists have demonstrated the importance of resources to organizing success 
among national women’s and civil-rights organizations in the mid-twentieth 
century in the United States;215 homelessness-rights organizations in cities in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s; 216  environmental organizations in both the 
United States and Western Europe;217 state-level suffrage organizations in the 
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nineteenth century;218 shantytown residents in Chile during the Pinochet re-
gime;219 and antiapartheid activists in South Africa.220 
Social-movement organizers recognize that a principal antecedent task to ef-
fective collective action is resource aggregation.221 So do their political oppo-
nents. Consider the battle over union funding that has persisted over many dec-
ades. Though union leaders and union opponents agree on little, they share a 
conviction that funding is essential to the success of the labor movement and its 
impact on politics.222 
While early work treated resources as an undifferentiated category, subse-
quent studies offer varying taxonomies of resources, tangible and intangible, 
upon which movements depend.223 Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy pro-
vide a fivefold typology: moral, cultural, social organization, human, and mate-
rial.224 Michael McCann discusses “instrumental” resources, which can be ma-
nipulated or exchanged in a direct way, and “movement culture” resources, 
which are associational bonds that contribute to effective communication and 
solidarity.225 Cress and Snow focus on four categories: moral, material, human, 
and informational resources.226 Though the literature has not settled on a single 
 
218. Holly J. McCammon, Stirring up Suffrage Sentiment: The Formation of the State Woman Suffrage 
Organizations, 1866-1914, 80 SOC. FORCES 449, 472 (2001). 
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way of unpacking the category of resources, certain types of resources repeatedly 
emerge as essential. These include: funding, informational resources, human re-
sources, and spaces—physical and virtual. Other intangible resources, such as 
credibility and legitimacy, are important as well. 
Obtaining sufficient resources to sustain effective organizing and political ac-
tivity is a significant challenge for social-movement organizations.227 As Mancur 
Olson warned in his classic text, when an organization primarily delivers collec-
tive goods, individuals will not, on their own, bear the costs of obtaining such 
goods.228 To some extent, this familiar account is overdrawn, as many individu-
als participate in social movements for ideological or moral reasons, even where 
rational-choice theorists would predict indifference.229 Nonetheless, few indi-
viduals can or will bear the full costs of sustaining social movements. The prob-
lem is particularly acute among communities with limited resources.230 
Classic public-choice theory has long recognized the organizational ad-
vantages of high-income, well-organized constituencies in the legislative and 
regulatory process, but it largely treats these advantages as a given.231 On this 
account, certain interests have an inevitable advantage over a dispersed public 
when it comes to resources. Law might shield against these advantages, for ex-
ample through limiting campaign contributions or adjusting judicial review of 
administrative action, but law is not itself responsible for creating the ad-
vantages.232 As the following Section demonstrates, however, the resource prob-
lem faced by poor people’s movements is already fundamentally shaped by law—
and can be reshaped by legal intervention. 
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1. Funding 
a. Charitable Donations: Limits and Pitfalls 
The most obvious resource needed by social-movement organizations for 
their operation and survival is money. Currently, the law facilitates fundraising 
primarily through grants of nonprofit status by state governments and tax-ex-
empt status by the Internal Revenue Service to qualified organizations.233 Foun-
dations, philanthropies, and individual donors contribute to qualified nonprofit 
organizations of their choice. In the process, donors reduce their own tax bur-
den. Most rights organizations in the United States are organized under section 
501(c)(3) of the tax code234 and receive the bulk of their funding from large do-
nations by foundations and philanthropies.235 
Legal-mobilization scholars largely have viewed this external funding as in-
dispensable to successful rights litigation and social-movement building. 236 
Early social-movement theory also emphasized the extent to which professional, 
philanthropically funded social-movement organizations contributed to move-
ment building in the 1960s and 1970s.237 
Although the value of donations to low-resourced organizations is substan-
tial, more recent work has demonstrated that reliance on foundation money and 
charitable donations also has significant drawbacks. First, the tax code puts con-
straints on the kinds of activities in which recipients of charitable donations can 
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engage.238 Organizations respond to these constraints by dividing their political 
activity from their nonpolitical tax-exempt activity and by limiting their political 
engagement.239 
Accordingly, several scholars who worry about the decline of mass-member-
ship organizations and their engagement in politics argue that the law should be 
reformed to permit political activity by 501(c)(3)s or at least those nonprofits 
that qualify as mass-membership organizations.240 But such a proposal misses 
the mark. Allowing 501(c)(3)s to engage in unfettered political activity would 
not address the fundamental problem created by social-movement organiza-
tions’ reliance on charitable donations: when most resources flow from elite do-
nors and foundations, those entities influence which organizations are funded, 
shaping the overall organizational landscape. Not surprisingly, social move-
ments that resonate with the concerns of relatively privileged social groups pre-
dominate. Groups that focus on the mobilization of the poor receive less funding 
and are less numerous than groups that focus on concerns of higher-income 
populations.241 
Second, and perhaps more troubling, when poor and working people’s or-
ganizations receive most of their funding from elite donors, the democratic char-
acter of such organizations can be undermined. 242  Organizations find their 
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priorities shaped by elites.243 Ultimately, such organizations become less likely 
to challenge structural inequalities that put elite interests at risk. 
Reliance on charitable donations also tends to shi� organizational priorities 
and tactics. Elite donors tend to show more interest in supporting litigation and 
policy campaigns and show less interest in funding membership mobilization, 
new-member organizing, and protest or other confrontational tactics.244 As a re-
sult, organizations develop extensive professional fundraising mechanisms, 
shi�ing resources and time away from organizing members and engaging them 
in collective action.245 
That is not to say that charitable donations are wholly unhelpful or that elites 
have fully captured social-movement organizations. Rather, such donations have 
long provided critical funding to struggling, low-income groups.246 Research 
also suggests that donations provide donors influence rather than full control.247 
Research does suggest, however, that sources of funding influence an organiza-
tion’s capacity for effective collective action. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that not all tax-exempt contributions carry the 
same level of capture risk. Daniel Cress and David Snow have found that when 
low-income groups receive a significant portion of their donations from “social 
gospelite” organizations or related social movements (e.g., religious institutions 
or labor unions), the risk of elite capture is reduced.248 In such cases, the insti-
tutions that are providing resources are themselves membership organizations, 
o�en part of the same social movement. Thus, homeless organizations have been 
successful by partnering with churches,249 while worker centers representing 
poor, vulnerable workers have been successful by partnering with unions.250 The 
more resource-rich social-movement organizations have enabled organizing 
among their impoverished counterparts. Still, overall resources available are lim-
ited under this model.251 
b. Self-Funding Facilitated by Law 
The previous Section shows that donations are unlikely, alone, to sustain 
mass-membership organizations that effectively counterbalance the power of the 
wealthy in our democracy. There may be good reasons to maintain the flow of 
donations to nonprofit organizations, but a mechanism for organizations to en-
gage in what sociologists refer to as “indigenous” funding—that is, dues or 
membership-based funding—is a critical supplement. 
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in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (increasing the standard deduction substantially for single 
and joint filers); see Joseph Rosenberg & Philip Stallworth, The House Tax Bill Is Not Very 
Charitable to Nonprofits, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org
/taxvox/house-tax-bill-not-very-charitable-nonprofits [https://perma.cc/L9CS-5WXA] 
(predicting a substantial decline in itemized deductions). In addition, social-justice organiza-
tions have begun to question whether a 501(c)(3) model, and its required focus on litigation 
and courts over politics and grass-roots organizing, is capable of producing lasting social 
change, and have created new 501(c)(4) branches that can engage in political action. Pozen, 
supra note 81. Although the shi� to 501(c)(4) “social-welfare” organizations might enable or-
ganizations to change their tactics, the change will not necessarily weaken the influence of 
elite donors on these organizations. Indeed, social-welfare organizations, like charitable non-
profits, are likely to derive much of their funding from elites. David S. Miller, Social Welfare 
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A dues model has the advantage of aligning an organization’s funding stream 
with basic commitments to democracy and self-governance. Organizations that 
are self-funded tend to be more accountable to their members, more democrati-
cally governed, and less at risk of a decline in funding due to changes in donor-
giving patterns or foundation priorities.252 The labor movement, in particular, 
has achieved independence and relative financial stability through a dues 
model.253 Numerous grassroots-organizing groups have recently begun to ex-
periment with dues systems in order to reduce their reliance on philanthropic 
donations.254 
In order for a dues model to sustain an organization, however, the Mancur 
Olson collective-action problem must be overcome. Absent a legal mechanism 
to mandate or facilitate dues, constituents are likely to free-ride, either for self-
interested (albeit rational) reasons or simply because of the logistical difficulty 
of contributing. Indeed, low-income individuals who, in principle, are willing to 
pay to support their organization frequently cannot do so easily because of lim-
ited access to banking or formal financial services.255 
The most direct way to remedy the collective-action problem is through legal 
reforms that mandate contributions. However, a legal requirement that land-
lords transfer a mandatory tenant fee to a membership-based tenant organiza-
tion, or that public-benefits providers transfer a mandatory recipient fee to wel-
fare-rights organizations, would likely be deemed unconstitutional, even if 
tenants or beneficiaries were given the option not to become organization mem-
bers. In Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, the Supreme Court concluded that a pub-
lic-sector employer cannot require that all workers covered by a collective-bar-
gaining agreement pay an agency fee to a labor organization to cover the cost of 
collective bargaining and grievance handling; such payment constitutes imper-
missible compelled speech.256 Under Janus’s logic, a government requirement 
that individuals contribute to a representative housing, welfare-rights, or debt-
ors organization would also likely violate the First Amendment. 
 
252. See Shayna Strom, Organizing’s Business Model Problem, CENTURY FOUND. 15-17 (Oct. 26 
2016), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2016/10/31124103/organizings-busi-
ness-model-problem.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5EC-6QJA]. 
253. See Fisk & Malin, supra note 222, at 1826-33. 
254. See Strom, supra note 252, at 6 (describing dues efforts of such groups as National Domestic 
Workers Alliance, the Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, and Kentuckians for the 
Commonwealth, as well as other innovative mechanisms of fundraising by grassroots organ-
izing groups). 
255. Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 182. 
256. 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459-60 (2018). 
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In separate articles, each of us has argued that the Janus majority’s First 
Amendment analysis is incorrect.257 But accepting the doctrine as binding, there 
are still several ways law can facilitate self-funding. First, the law could permit 
private entities and social-movement organizations to enter into contracts that 
require fees and that facilitate the fee transfers, as is permitted under the NLRA 
for private-sector employers and unions.258 For example, the law could enable 
membership-based tenant organizations of low-income renters to negotiate con-
tracts with private landlords that require tenants to pay a small percentage of 
their monthly rent to their tenant organization in exchange for services provided 
by that organization. Because the state itself would not be compelling fees under 
this approach, state action would not be sufficient to trigger the First Amend-
ment.259 
A second approach would be for the law to require private entities to facilitate 
the transfer of voluntary dues. This approach is unlikely to solve fully the collec-
tive-action problems discussed above. Comparative data on labor unions 
strongly suggest that voluntary dues, even when paired with services available 
only to members, result in a significant free-rider dynamic.260 But a facilitative 
model does vastly improve upon the status quo, solving some of the logistical 
hurdles that exist when organizations seek to fundraise internally. One promis-
ing example is the recently enacted New York City law that gives employees the 
option of deducting contributions to qualified nonprofit organizations that will 
advocate for nonunion workers; if employees exercise this option, the law re-
quires employers to facilitate such transfers.261 Another example is the volun-
tary-dues campaigns that many unions have engaged in the a�ermath of Janus, 
where unions obtain dues authorization and the public employer subsequently 
transfers money to the union.262 In order to ensure stability, many states allow 
 
257. Andrias, supra note 91, at 29-30; Benjamin I. Sachs, Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 
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government, is not a First Amendment problem at all.”). 
258. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2018); NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741-42 (1963). 
259. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (reserving the question whether private-sector agency fees violate 
the Constitution). 
260. See Fisk & Malin, supra note 222, at 1926-30. 
261. Rest. Law Ctr. v. City of New York, 360 F. Supp. 3d 192, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Justin Miller, 
In New York City, Fast-Food Workers May Soon Have a Permanent Voice, AM. PROSPECT (June 
16, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/new-york-city-fast-food-workers-may-soon-have-per-
manent-voice [https://perma.cc/8BAA-5XNH]. 
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ing, BLOOMBERG L. (June 26, 2020, 6:15 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
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revocation of authorization only during designated windows.263 A similar model 
could facilitate transfers to tenant organizations, debtors’ unions, and organiza-
tions of public-benefits recipients. Finally, to encourage membership, organiza-
tions can combine the voluntary-dues model with provision of benefits and ser-
vices, such as insurance, education, discount cards, and legal assistance; the 
National Rifle Association and the American Association of Retired People have 
both successfully used this approach.264 Indeed, government could empower or-
ganizations to serve as providers of social-welfare benefits, as in the Ghent sys-
tem in Europe, where unions administer unemployment insurance, thereby 
providing organizations additional opportunities to recruit voluntary-dues pay-
ments.265 
To be sure, self-funding models are not a panacea, particularly when mem-
bers can afford only minimal donations.266 Self-funding models can also have 
demobilizing effects, creating a transactional model in which members pay dues 
in exchange for services but do not engage in the broader movement work. 
Nonetheless, even movement organizations skeptical of a transactional-dues ap-
proach recognize that a membership-funding system helps safeguard against 
elite domination and, if combined with other organizational commitments, 
builds a more participatory and effective organization.267 The model should thus 
be one part of a multipronged approach to facilitating resource aggregation. 
c. Cost-Shi�ing 
A variation on a self-funding model would shi� costs to the entity around 
which the social-movement organization is organizing. That is, the law could 
require those entities to pay for a portion of the organizing activity. For example, 
landlords of low-income residents could be required to contribute a small per-
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34-35. 
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324-25 (2012). 
266. See Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 182-83 (reporting that dues requirements for worker-
center members were thought to be “terribly onerous”); Cress & Snow, supra note 212, at 
1094-1107 (demonstrating that for homeless social-movement organizations to be viable, ex-
ternal resources are essential, and explaining that homeless organizations have been particu-
larly successful where their external funders were “social gospelite” organizations, not elites). 
267. Ashar & Fisk, supra note 244, at 166, 183. 
the yale law journal 130:546  2021 
606 
Public-benefits programs could contribute a small percentage of their budget to 
the representative welfare-rights organizations. Lenders could be required to 
contribute a percentage of profits to debtor organizations. 
One problem with this approach is that, as applied to private payors, it would 
likely face constitutional challenge under the Supreme Court’s evolving com-
pelled-speech doctrine. 268  A potential alternative would permit social-move-
ment organizations to bargain for such transfers without mandating them by 
law. Still, skeptics might worry that if a social-movement organization’s funding 
comes from one of its targets and opponents, the organization may be more 
likely to curb its tactics and demands.269 The organization could even become 
dependent on the entity with whom it negotiates and against whom it advocates. 
However, this concern can be mitigated by ensuring that only a portion of funds 
are from this stream and, to the extent constitutionally permitted, by making 
cost transfers mandatory by law, or bargained through arms-length transactions, 
rather than at the discretion of the funder.270 
d. State Subsidies 
Another helpful (and constitutionally permissible) legal intervention would 
be to provide for government funding of social-movement organizations as a 
supplement to self-funding and charitable donations.271 Public funding has his-
torically been an important part of social movements’ funding base. For exam-
ple, since the 1960s, a large number of women’s movement groups have taken 
 
268. See Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
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271. On the constitutionality of governmental funding for entities with particular viewpoints, see, 
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on social-service functions in exchange for funding from the government.272 
Also during the mid-1960s, as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Pov-
erty, Congress established the Community Action Program, charged with help-
ing the poor develop “autonomous and self-managed organizations which are 
competent to exert political influence on behalf of their own self-interest.”273 
Government-funded Community Action Agencies (CAA) recruited “issue-ori-
ented community organizers” and provided “financial assistance to indigenous 
community organizations.”274 More recently, worker centers representing low-
wage workers have “collaborat[ed] with government agencies, particularly on 
enforcement campaigns in progressive jurisdictions with expansive, but under-
enforced legal protections for workers,” which has “generated . . . financial sup-
port” for the centers “in the form of government grants to facilitate investigation 
and enforcement . . . and training in know-your-rights programs.”275 
A challenge is that state subsidies usually come with strings attached. Thus, 
an organization “seeking affirmative state assistance invites a political debate 
over whether or how much such assistance is justified” and “about the conditions 
 
272. See Myra Marx Ferree & Patricia Yancey Martin, Doing the Work of the Movement: Feminist 
Organizations, in FEMINIST ORGANIZATIONS: HARVEST OF THE NEW WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 19, 
21 (Myra Marx Ferree & Patricia Yancey Martin eds., 1995) (discussing the impact on select 
feminist organizations of receiving funding from the government). 
273. J. DAVID GREENSTONE & PAUL E. PETERSON, RACE AND AUTHORITY IN URBAN POLITICS: COM-
MUNITY PARTICIPATION AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 5 (1973) (quoting Office of Econ. Oppor-
tunity, Workbook: Community Action Program, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH (Mar. 18, 1965), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED103502.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK25-4UKE]); see id. at 7 
(“[T]he fundamental political objective was generally understood to be the organization and 
consequent institutionalization of black (and other minority group) interests.”); see also Tara 
J. Melish, Maximum Feasible Participation of the Poor: New Governance, New Accountability, and 
a 21st Century War on the Sources of Poverty, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 8-12 (2010) (dis-
cussing successes and failures of community action programs (CAPs) and urging a contem-
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that should be attached to the assistance.”276 This debate is one worth having 
and should become less burdensome as mass-membership organizations grow. 
Moreover, while relying exclusively on state funding would leave organizations 
vulnerable to changes in the political climate, state funding can be one important 
part of a mixed-funding regime and can help serve as “seed” money while or-
ganizations build their indigenous funding. Improving upon past efforts, state 
funding could be targeted to organizations that meet particular criteria. For ex-
ample, grants could take into account organizational mission, leadership-devel-
opment practices, and whether the organization is governed by members, feder-
ated in structure, and inclusive.277 
2. Physical and Virtual Spaces 
In addition to funding, physical and virtual spaces for organizing are essen-
tial to the success of mass-membership organizations. As Daniel Cress and David 
Snow write, “A regular place to meet and adequate supplies are requisites for 
doing regular organizational business.”278 They quote a supporter of the Detroit 
Union of the Homeless, who observes that “[t]here is a kind of franticness when 
you don’t really have a place where you can invite anybody into. But when you 
do, people can find you. Strategies can be developed. You can get a sense of your 
own identity.”279 
Sociologists have demonstrated that natural gathering spaces, where people 
are in close proximity, are the most fruitful locations for social-movement build-
ing.280 Yet many of the spaces in which poor people naturally congregate are con-
trolled not by those people themselves, nor by their social-movement organiza-
tions, but rather by governmental or corporate entities. Providing access to these 
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spaces can be particularly helpful for organization building: access communi-
cates acquisition and control of a space in which poor and working people typi-
cally have little authority and thereby helps legitimize the social-movement or-
ganization.281 
In the contemporary era, the availability of digital—that is, internet-based—
“space” can be just as important as the availability of physical space. In the labor 
context, for instance, workers o�en no longer share a common workplace and 
thus simply have no shared physical space in which to congregate, discuss, and 
organize. The same is true for debtors, who may live dispersed across the entire 
nation and for whom no feasible central physical meeting location exists.282 In 
these settings, access to email, text, social media, and other “digital meeting 
spaces” can be critical,283 and, in fact, access to such digital resources for organ-
izing purposes is a hotly contested question in NLRB law.284 This is true for the 
simple reason that digital resources can be powerful substitutes for physical 
spaces. Take, for example, the recent Google walkouts—protest actions engaged 
in by workers across the globe whose only contact with one another was through 
online forums and tools.285 It is also the case that teachers involved in organizing 
the RedforEd movement gathered on a Facebook page, as well as in person.286 
Indeed, digital spaces can be important to organizing even where physical 
space is available, especially in contexts where meeting online is more practicable 
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or advantageous than gathering together in a single physical location.287 This 
principle has been most apparent in the era of COVID-19, when the need for 
social distancing means that in-person meetings, especially large ones, are a pub-
lic-health threat. Unions are recommending that workers who can no longer or-
ganize in person gather on Zoom instead.288 And tenant activists are turning to 
the internet to organize rent protests and strikes during the economic crisis that 
the pandemic has produced. According to one organizer, “If you’re bringing new 
people into your movement right now, you’re doing it online.”289 
The potential for legal intervention to provide access to both physical and 
digital spaces is significant. The law could provide a legal right for both paid 
organizers and organization members to access the relevant constituency groups 
in person and online. It could grant the right to come onto employer property, 
to enter building lobbies and common areas, and to hold meetings in welfare 
centers. The law could also provide access to digital meeting spaces, requiring 
employers, landlords, benefit providers, and lenders to provide digital resources 
to workers, tenants, benefit recipients, and borrowers for organizing pur-
poses.290 We discuss some of these options in more detail below when we take 
up the need for “free” associative spaces.291 
3. Information 
Another critical resource for social-movement organizations is information, 
particularly information about the organization’s constituency. 292  Organizers 
need to know who the relevant constituency is and where they can be contacted: 
Who are the workers in a given firm, the tenants in a given building, or the re-
cipients of a given welfare benefit? 
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The NLRA again provides a partial model. It requires employers to provide 
an Excelsior list of bargaining-unit members to a union that makes a showing of 
employee interest in being represented by that union.293 The list includes both 
names and contact information. Similar informational rights exist under several 
states’ public-sector bargaining systems, requiring, for example, that unions be 
notified when new members join the bargaining unit and afforded the oppor-
tunity to meet with new unit members (on the clock).294 Statutes could create 
parallel rights for tenant organizations, debtor organizations, public-benefits or-
ganizations, and so on. 
In addition to information about the constituency, organizations also need 
information about the broader political and economic context in which they are 
organizing. To some extent, the internet has made such information more acces-
sible, facilitating movement activity.295 Yet, much information remains proprie-
tary and inaccessible to workers, tenants, debtors, welfare beneficiaries, and their 
social-movement organizations. For example, a recent study found that only four 
percent of workers have access to information about compensation of senior ex-
ecutives, managers, supervisors, and colleagues, as well as information about 
how well their organization is doing.296 
Here, legal intervention could again be valuable. Law could require the dis-
closure of relevant information about the relevant entity, industry, or program 
to inform the strategic work of the social-movement organization. For example, 
the NLRA has been interpreted to require that employers provide information 
to unions about their finances to the extent such information is relevant to the 
employer’s bargaining positions.297 Law could impose similar obligations in the 
context of housing, public benefits, and education debt. Or, even better, it could 
require more expansive disclosure that does not hinge on bargaining positions 
or organizational requests. Washington, D.C.’s tenant law provides a partial 
model: it provides tenant organizations the right to information about new 
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development and the right to an appraisal during any sale process.298 Ultimately, 
disclosure of information is critical not only to engaging with the private entity 
but also to social-movement organizations’ engaging in the political process in 
an informed way. 
4. Human Resources 
A final category of resources that is essential to organization success is human 
resources—including labor, leadership, and expertise.299 Yet a movement’s abil-
ity to deploy human resources is limited by the time and skill available to its 
constituents. Poor and working-class people tend to have less leisure time to do-
nate to organizations; they also frequently have fewer technical skills to provide 
(though no less potential).300 
Here too, law could make a significant difference. It could guarantee paid 
time off for individuals to participate in the organization and to attend leadership 
or technical training, possibly reimbursing employers, or allowing them to de-
duct from taxes the amount of wages they pay to people for participation. Jury-
duty laws provide one model. Eight states require an employer to pay employees 
while serving on jury duty.301 Labor law also provides some examples. Under 
numerous private collective-bargaining agreements and under several public-
sector labor-relations statutes, employees are permitted to perform organization 
functions on official time (i.e., release time with pay from their regular duties). 
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, for example, requires 
that union representatives who are also employees of the agency be granted 
 
298. D.C. CODE § 42-3404.02 (2020). 
299. Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 127. 
300. A significant literature in sociology examines the importance of both leadership development 
and rank-and-file militancy and participation in poor people’s organizations. See, e.g., Stuart 
Eimer, The Crisis of New Labor and Alinsky’s Legacy: Some Questions, Comments, and Problems, 
43 POL. & SOC’Y 443, 444-45 (2015); Paul Osterman, Building Progressive Organizations: An 
Alternative View, 43 POL. & SOC’Y 447, 449 (2015); see also Paul Osterman, Evading the Iron 
Law: Culture and Ritual in Social Movement Organizations, MASS. INST. TECH. 22-27 (Mar. 
2004), http://web.mit.edu/osterman/www/Evading-Iron-Law-Osterman.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Y2RV-KZ44] (arguing that successful social-movement leadership potentially re-
quires an adversarial culture within the organization and an enhanced sense of capacity and 
agency within the membership). We recognize that the legal interventions we propose do 
little to build leadership or rank-and-file militancy directly beyond creating the time and 
funds for development. That is not because we believe those goals are unimportant but rather 
because we are skeptical the law has much to offer. 
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official time for negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement, including partic-
ipation in impasse proceedings.302 Numerous state systems, even those that are 
“right-to-work,” similarly mandate paid release time. 303 Other collective-bar-
gaining agreements provide education funds so that workers can increase their 
skills.304 
The precise design of a release-time requirement would vary depending on 
the context. For example, a tenant-related law could require unpaid release time 
for workers to participate in tenant-organizing efforts and in training programs, 
with the member able to recoup lost wages up to a designated amount from the 
landlord. In the public-benefits context, to the extent states require public-ben-
efits recipients to work, labor performed for movement organizations could 
count as qualified work.305 
C. Free Spaces 
Another prominent strand of social-movement theory suggests that success-
ful political organizing depends on the availability of “free spaces” open to and 
suitable for organizational work.306 The literature takes a capacious view of what 
such spaces may consist of, and it includes discussion of both literal physical 
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spaces—for example, churches,307 mosques,308 student dormitories,309 and un-
ion halls 310 —but also more abstract figurative spaces including linguistic 
codes311 and artistic performance.312 Despite the breadth of concepts encom-
passed in the definition of free space, however, there is some agreement on core 
elements of the definition. In summarizing work on the question, for example, 
Rick Fantasia and Eric L. Hirsch conclude that “[o]n the most basic level” free 
spaces are 
meeting places where communication can be facilitated without defer-
ence to those in power, representing “liberated zones” to which people 
can retreat, spatial “preserves” where oppositional culture and group sol-
idarity can be nourished, tested, and protected. It is in such relatively 
“free” social spaces that members of subordinate groups discover their 
common problems, construct a collective definition of the sources of 
their oppression, and note the limits of routine means of redressing 
grievances, where collective identity and solidarity are cultivated in prac-
tices, values, and social relations.313 
Similarly, William A. Gamson writes that free spaces are “limited access pub-
lic spaces that permit the development of an oppositional culture.”314 And Fran-
cesca Polletta, although critical of aspects of the free-space literature, concludes 
that there is broad agreement among scholars that in identifying the unifying 
characteristic of a free space, “freedom from the surveillance of authorities is es-
sential.”315 In sum, then, the free-space literature suggests that political organiz-
ing requires space in which groups can assemble to discuss their grievances and 
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develop their objectives and in which they are free of interference from those in 
power who would oppose their organizational efforts. 
The theoretical work on free space is complimented by historical analysis of 
the role that such spaces have played in social-movement mobilization. Perhaps 
the central animating example is the role played by Black churches, both in the 
struggle against slavery and in the Civil Rights movement. Thus, Sara M. Evans 
and Harry C. Boyte write that successful political mobilization requires “com-
munity places . . . where [movement participants] can think and talk and social-
ize, removed from the scrutiny and control of those who hold power over their 
lives. The black church especially has played this crucial role as a free space in 
black history.”316 Aldon D. Morris, in examining the origins of the Civil Rights 
movement, observes that the church played a central role by providing “a safe 
environment in which to hold political meetings”317 and “an institutional alter-
native to, and an escape from, the racism and hostility of the larger society. Be-
hind the church doors was a friendly and warm environment where Black people 
could be temporarily at peace with themselves while displaying their talents and 
aspirations before an empathetic audience.”318 Gamson, summarizing Morris’s 
historical work, put it more bluntly: “Morris shows the centrality of the Black 
churches in the building of the Southern civil rights movement. . . . [T]hey pro-
vided a place where Blacks could assemble without whites being present.”319 
Critically, and obviously, the church was more than a “space” for organiza-
tional activity: it was, among other things, a rich source of spiritual tradition, 
deep community ties, and leadership. The point here is simply that the church 
played a crucial role by providing a free space for political organizing. 
Similar to the church’s role as a safe space for civil-rights organizing, Fantasia 
and Hirsch document the role played by the mosque—and the Casbah—in Al-
gerian resistance to French colonization.320 Dingxin Zhao writes about the im-
portance of the physical structure of Beijing university campuses to the mobili-
zation of students during the 1989 democracy movement, noting that “the 
existence of campus walls”—which separated student living space from the pub-
lic road system—“was important for the development of the movement,” and 
concluding that “the simple existence of walls . . . created a low-risk environment 
and facilitated student mobilization.”321 And Hirsch stresses the importance of 
so-called Turner halls as “havens where the Chicago working class . . . could 
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develop their politics in relative isolation from the intrusions of the city’s political 
and business elite.”322 
Of course, the existence of free spaces is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
political organization. To state the obvious, much more is required for successful 
political organizing than a physical location for meetings free of surveillance.323 
But the literature provides a solid basis for concluding that the presence of free 
spaces can be an important contributing factor to the success of political-organ-
izing efforts. 
Accordingly, the question for us is what the law might plausibly do to facili-
tate the creation of free spaces for political organizing. We see two basic catego-
ries of possible interventions: (1) the provision of space and (2) prohibitions on 
surveillance. Labor law, again, provides an incomplete but important model for 
these types of intervention. Under the rules set out in the Supreme Court’s Re-
public Aviation opinion, employers must allow employees to discuss unionization 
efforts in the workplace, so long as those discussions occur during nonworking 
time.324 Moreover, in certain narrow circumstances—in fact, extremely narrow 
circumstances under current law—employers must allow nonemployee union 
organizers to access company property for the purpose of discussing union or-
ganizing with employees.325 Coupled with these grants of rights to use employer 
property for organizational purposes is a ban on employer surveillance of em-
ployee-organizing activity. Thus, “[s]ince the earliest days of the Act, surveil-
lance of employees by an employer, whether with supervisors, rank-and-file em-
ployees, or outsiders, has consistently been held to” constitute an unfair labor 
practice. 326  Accordingly, federal labor law creates a legal requirement that 
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employers cede part of their property rights to the organizational efforts of their 
workers and prohibits employers from engaging in surveillance of those efforts. 
Still, “only slightly over half of workers report having access to physical spaces” 
to meet with other workers (let alone organizers), “and access is more likely for 
higher-income and more highly educated workers.”327 
Building on the partial precedent provided by labor law, a law of political 
organizing could require the provision of space within the property of the dom-
inant party. As the above discussion anticipates, moreover, this might be space 
within the physical property of the dominant party, or it might be “space” within 
the digital resources of the dominant party. Thus, for example, tenants and ten-
ant organizations could be entitled to access space within buildings where they 
are organizing, or have organized, tenants.328 Public-benefits recipients could be 
provided space in welfare centers. Workers and their organizations—in an ex-
pansion of current rights—could be entitled to space on company property. Sim-
ilarly, the law could mandate that employers, landlords, lenders, or welfare agen-
cies provide workers, tenants, debtors, and benefits recipients the right to use 
the dominant party’s online resources (such as email lists, websites, and chat 
rooms) for organizing purposes. In addition, or alternatively, the law could re-
quire the creation of public spaces—political meeting halls, essentially—funded 
by tax dollars and made available to political organizations for organizational 
purposes. Here, again, the public spaces could be physical or digital. Finally, the 
law might subsidize the cost of procuring such space on the private market: po-
litical organizations could receive tax credits for reasonable costs incurred in se-
curing space for organizational efforts. 
It is worth noting that there are costs and benefits to each of these ap-
proaches. With respect to a legal requirement that organizations be granted 
space within the property—physical or digital—of the targets of their organiza-
tional activity, the downside is that preventing surveillance may be more 
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difficult. Moreover, even absent actual surveillance, participants may be more 
wary of surveillance in these settings and thus, whether or not they are actually 
being surveilled, feel less free to “question the rationalizing ideologies of the 
dominant order”329 and organize. On the other hand, there can be significant 
symbolic value in allowing organizing to take place on the physical property or 
the digital resources of the opposition. For one thing, such access signals to par-
ticipants that the organizations in question are not outsiders to the relationship 
around which organizing is taking place: for example, a worker organization that 
meets in a company break room—or a company chat room or listserv—can come 
to seem a more natural part of the work relationship than one that meets only 
off-site in a union hall. More important from an organizing perspective, granting 
on-site space to organizations can signal the vulnerability of the opposing party in 
a way that can be critical to success. 
The political-process model of social-movement emergence helps illuminate 
this point.330 As Doug McAdam shows, successful collective action—in our con-
text, successful political organizing—depends on, among other things, the “col-
lective assessment [by participants] of the prospects for successful insur-
gency.” 331  This assessment, in turn, depends on participants holding two 
interrelated views: first, they must believe that the organizations they are form-
ing have the potential to exercise effective power, and, second, they must believe 
that the status quo—the forces they are contesting—are “vulnerable to chal-
lenge.”332 This perception of vulnerability is accordingly a prerequisite to suc-
cessful organizing. The point makes intuitive sense. If participants believe that 
the current regime is invincible, they are unlikely to participate in an organizing 
campaign designed to change those conditions. On the other hand, if individuals 
can be shown that the current structure is subject to challenge—that it is vulner-
able to the efforts of an organized opposition—then participation becomes more 
plausible. As Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward put it, “The social arrange-
ments that are ordinarily perceived [to be] . . . immutable must come to 
seem . . . mutable.”333 
The employer’s control over the workplace, like the landlord’s control over 
the building, can be an important means for communicating power and thus for 
signaling to workers and tenants that neither the employer nor the landlord is 
vulnerable to challenge. This suggests, however, that by enabling organizers to 
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access workplaces and buildings, the law can disrupt these projections of invin-
cibility and communicate that employers and landlords may in fact be vulnerable 
to challenge. As one of us explained previously, 
As vigorous as employers are when it comes to attempts to prohibit their 
own employees from talking union at work, they are even more adamant 
when it comes to the ability of full-time union organizers to come onto 
employer property to discuss unionization. . . . This opposition stems in 
part from the fact that physical presence of union organizers on company 
property marks a major incursion into the employer’s control over the 
workplace. Excluding union organizers thus reinforces a perception of 
employer control. By the same token, a legal requirement that employers 
admit union organizers conveys to workers management’s susceptibility 
to the law of union organizing.334 
Indeed, a classic scene from the film Norma Rae captured this dynamic cine-
matically. At the outset of that movie—which involved a union-organizing drive 
at a textile mill in the southern United States—the union organizer is barred 
from the factory by a locked, barbed-wire fence. This exercise of employer prop-
erty rights clearly conveys employer power and dominance vis-à-vis the union. 
But later in the film, the organizer is permitted—through the operation of a con-
tempt sanction imposed under federal labor law—to walk through the factory in 
order to inspect a company bulletin board. The scene of a union representative 
physically present in what had previously been a site of unchallenged employer 
authority communicates to workers on the shop floor a new sense that perhaps 
the employer is vulnerable to union challenge.335 
Thus, because perceptions of vulnerability can contribute to the success of 
organizing efforts, a legal requirement that organizations be granted on-site 
“free spaces” has significant virtue. But whether organizing space is granted on-
site or off, a note is in order about the challenges of making sure such space is 
genuinely free—the challenges of preventing surveillance in the modern era. 
Much of the free-space literature examines social-movement development that 
occurred prior to the proliferation of smartphone, internet, and modern surveil-
lance technology. Although, of course, state actors possessed electronic-surveil-
lance capabilities during the Civil Rights era, those technologies were relatively 
less available to nonstate actors like employers and landlords. This is no longer 
the case. The proliferation of cybertechnology means that nongovernment ac-
tors—including employers and landlords—have access to affordable means for 
surveilling challengers, should they wish to do so. In today’s environment, an 
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employer or landlord could purchase a device that looks like a cockroach or a 
dragonfly and provides high-quality video and audio recordings of any organiz-
ing meeting.336 Surveillance capabilities are certainly as great in cyberspace and 
thus the challenge of ensuring surveillance-free digital organizing is also a 
daunting one. 
For our purposes, this means that if the legal regime is to provide free space 
for political organizing it must also protect against sophisticated forms of sur-
veillance. At a minimum, the law should establish meaningful sanctions for any 
type of surveillance carried out against political-organizing efforts. These sanc-
tions should include punitive damages. Beyond sanctions, the law also could 
provide for public funding of antisurveillance technologies, either through direct 
provision or tax credits for organizations that incur reasonable expenses pur-
chasing such technologies. 
D. Removing Barriers to Participation 
Legal reforms to facilitate aggregation of resources and access to spaces are 
essential, but they are not sufficient to enable organization building among vul-
nerable populations. As sociologists have documented, a movement organiza-
tion’s vitality and longevity are dependent on its ability to attract and retain 
members.337 Yet, even when participants are motivated and sufficient resources 
exist, several barriers to recruitment and retention remain. 
A chief obstacle for many individuals is fear of reprisal. As sociologists have 
demonstrated, fear of retaliation can jeopardize collective action, particularly in 
high-risk environments.338 Among low-income populations, the risk is high. For 
workers, tenants, debtors, and benefit recipients, retaliation might mean the loss 
of livelihoods, shelter, future creditworthiness, and emergency support. 
Retaliation and repression do not always defeat organization. Movement 
identity, solidarity, and social bonds can help individuals resist and challenge 
authority. Rick Fantasia, for example, illuminates how organizing and strikes 
foster a culture of solidarity that makes it possible for workers to persist, even in 
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the face of antiunion campaigning, intimidation, and arrests.339 Jeff Goodwin 
and Steven Pfaff show that intimate social networks, mass meetings, collective 
identities, shaming, and appeals to divine protection all helped mitigate fears of 
police repression and encouraged movement participation during both the Civil 
Rights movement and the East German Opposition movement.340 At the same 
time, the literature highlights the extent to which repressive action by state and 
private actors frequently prevails, impeding successful organizing and even lead-
ing to organizational collapse.341 
A second barrier to joining and remaining part of a movement organization 
is life responsibility, which can render people, in sociologist Sharon Nepstad’s 
terms, “biographically unavailable.”342 Numerous sociologists observe that full-
time employment, family obligations, lack of transportation, and other material 
obstacles can pose significant barriers to movement participation.343 Some indi-
viduals overcome these barriers because of deep motivation and allegiance to the 
cause or because of connections to other organization members.344 Yet, sociolo-
gists have demonstrated that overcoming barriers need not only be a personal, 
individual-level effort. Some social movements have had success by providing 
material assistance and family support so that members are free to participate. 
Nepstad, for example, has documented how the Catholic Le� Plowshares 
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movement provided stable childcare so protesters could go to prison if needed; 
the organization also provided housing, legal support, transportation, and other 
assistance.345 
Law may not be able to increase individual motivation, build social networks, 
or foster solidarity, but it can help remove barriers to participation—both by pro-
tecting those engaged in organizing work from retaliation and by removing ma-
terial obstacles to participation. 
First and foremost, the law must protect all those involved in organizing ef-
forts from retaliation: no worker may be fired, no tenant evicted, and no welfare 
recipient deprived of benefits because they are active in or supportive of the or-
ganization’s efforts. Penalties and enforcement mechanisms must be strong 
enough to deter violations of law. Indeed, several regimes protect organizing 
rights, including the NLRA and several states’ tenant laws, but lack sufficient 
penalties or enforcement mechanisms to ensure consistent compliance.346 Pri-
vate rights of action, compensatory and punitive damages, class relief, prohibi-
tions on mandatory arbitration, and other strong remedies are necessary to truly 
remove this barrier to participation.347 
In addition, the law could provide just-cause protections. Under this model, 
no worker could be fired, no tenant evicted, no welfare recipient deprived of ben-
efits without the employer, landlord, or benefit provider demonstrating just 
cause.348 The victim would not need to show antiorganizing animus or that op-
position to organization was a motivating factor in the adverse action. The ad-
vantage of this approach is that it could create a more secure environment, shi�-
ing the burden to the authority figure when a dispute about retaliation exists. 
Yet, even just-cause provisions are no panacea. General due-process protections 
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Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2012); Fine & Gordon, supra note 275, at 562; Myriam 
Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 
EMORY L.J. 1531, 1531-32 (2016). 
348. See Kate Andrias & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Ending At-Will Employment: A Guide for Just 
Cause Reform, ROOSEVELT INST. 5-8 (2021), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/end-
ing-at-will-employment-a-guide-for-just-cause-reform [https://perma.cc/K2RU-E8LA]. 
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already exist in several of these areas—in public benefits, for example349—and 
power dynamics still create fear of reprisal. Antiretaliation and just-cause protec-
tions, while helpful, must be part of a broader regime enabling organizing. 
To that end, law should also work to remove material barriers. Here, the lit-
erature on resources is again instructive.350 As discussed above, the law could 
require paid time off from work; it could also provide subsidized childcare or 
other material support for participation in qualified organization activities.351 
E. Material Changes, Incremental Victories, and Structural Power 
Another facilitator of organizing success is success itself. That is, the ability 
of people to build powerful organizations depends on their ability, first, to win 
smaller-scale, incremental victories along the way, and, second, to operate in 
structures that enable meaningful large-scale victories. 
The origins of the insight about incremental victories can be traced to Saul 
Alinsky, a community organizer and author of Rules for Radicals. In that book, 
Alinsky lays out a program for building mass political organizations based on his 
own experience as an organizer and educator. Alinsky stresses the importance of 
winning small-scale victories this way: 
The organizer knows . . . that his biggest job is to give the people the 
feeling that they can do something, that while they may accept the idea 
that organization means power, they have to experience this idea in ac-
tion. The organizer’s job is to begin to build confidence and hope in the 
idea of organization and thus in the people themselves: to win limited 
victories, each of which will build confidence and the feeling that “if we 
can do so much with what we have now just think what we will be able 
to do when we get big and strong.”352 
Alinsky’s thesis is borne out by both sociological accounts of organizing cam-
paigns and the theoretical literature on collective efficacy. Thus, for example, in 
his seminal study of the union campaign at Springfield Hospital, Rick Fantasia 
reports that workers’ successful engagement in what he calls “mini-insurrec-
tions”—small-scale collective actions—increased the likelihood that they would 
 
349. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
350. For a discussion of how organizers ensure access to, and mobilization of, resources crucial to 
the success of social movements, see, for example, Edwards & McCarthy, supra note 207, at 
131-43. 
351. See supra text accompanying notes 301-305. 
352. ALINSKY, supra note 179, at 113-14. 
the yale law journal 130:546  2021 
624 
participate in more full-scale union organizing efforts.353 Fantasia concludes that 
workers gained a “courageousness” from their experience with small-scale or-
ganizing success and that this courageousness was a “crucial component of union 
formation, especially in the face of sharp employer resistance.”354 Similarly, in 
her study of the contemporary labor movement, Rachel Meyer concludes that 
organizers can increase the prospects for ultimate success by making it “possible 
for people to first succeed at small collective actions so that they become aware 
of their power to make change.”355 
The theoretical literature on efficacy also confirms Alinsky’s insight. This lit-
erature suggests that people decide what actions to take in the face of obstacles 
based on perceptions of their efficacy in overcoming those obstacles. Crucially, 
according to Albert Bandura’s work, people learn to assess their efficacy based on 
past experiences: when we succeed at one task, we come to believe that we are 
capable of performing similar, but more difficult, tasks in the future. Thus, “par-
tial mastery experiences” facilitate “subsequent performance of threatening tasks 
that [one has] never done before.”356 This form of “efficacy learning,” moreover, 
applies at both the individual and the collective levels, suggesting that participa-
tion in successful collective endeavors—however modest—increases the pro-
spects for participation in more robust forms of collective activity.357 
What might the law do to facilitate efficacy learning in organizing? In a 
sense, all of our recommendations further this goal. A�er all, all of our recom-
mendations are geared to increase the likelihood of organizational success, and 
thus all will hopefully make it more likely for participants to experience the kind 
of victories that fuel further organizing. But there are specific things law might 
do to make early-stage, tangible, and small-scale organizing victories possible. 
First, the law can make small-scale tangible gains more likely by imposing 
bargaining obligations in each of our areas of focus. Thus, landlords could be 
legally required to bargain with tenants’ unions, welfare agencies with benefit-
recipient unions, and employers with workers’ unions. The scope of the obliga-
tion should be cra�ed explicitly to allow unions to bargain for a wide range of 
 
353. FANTASIA, supra note 339, at 121-80. 
354. Id. at 121, 145. 
355. Sachs, supra note 203, at 2736 (citing Rachel Meyer, The Irony of Power: Efficacy and Collec-
tive Action in Working-Class Struggle 4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thors)). 
356. Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 122, 128 
(1982). 
357. See ALBERT BANDURA, SELF-EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL 478 (1997) (stating that 
“efficacy beliefs have similar sources, serve similar functions, and operate through similar pro-
cesses” and that perceptions of self-efficacy “affect how well group members work together 
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goals. Thus, in the tenant context, the obligation could cover rent, terms of evic-
tion, environmental standards, and the like, but it could also require landlords 
to bargain over details that tenants would find meaningful if not transforma-
tional. Similarly, in the labor context, the obligation should enable workers’ or-
ganizations to bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions, but also over 
other aspects of the work relationship that matter to the workers—say, the avail-
ability of a water cooler or a coffee station. 
This suggestion tracks, in part, the current obligation to bargain in good 
faith that federal labor law imposes on employers when a union represents that 
employer’s employees. 358  Unfortunately, the NLRA’s good-faith requirement 
has proven insufficient as a means of encouraging the parties to reach actual 
agreement.359 Thus, a law designed to facilitate small-scale victories might need 
to go further than this requirement. The suggestions contained in this Article 
aimed at strengthening the right to protest and strike are one avenue to explore. 
Another direction worth considering would be to couple the bargaining obliga-
tion with the so-called “interest arbitration” of first agreements. Under an inter-
est-arbitration procedure, the parties would attempt to conclude negotiations of 
a first agreement, but in the event they are not successful, the dispute would be 
resolved by a neutral arbitrator who could shape the contours of the first agree-
ment. This process would thus help ensure that some gains for tenants, benefit 
recipients, or workers emerged from the bargaining process.360 The magnitude 
of those gains would depend on how much power the union had built, but since 
the goal is to enable participants to have a first experience with organizing suc-
cess, the fact of progress matters more than the degree of it. 
While incremental small-scale victories are essential, a system designed to 
build countervailing political power among organizations of the poor and work-
ing class must also create structures that enable those groups to exercise effective 
economic and political power. Thus, the scope of the bargaining obligation 
ought to be cra�ed to track the relevant economic and political system in which 
the organizations operate. In the labor context, this approach would mean that 
bargaining would be required to occur at a sectoral level in addition to the 
 
358. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2018) (providing that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an 
employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees”); id. 
§ 158(d) (providing that, in order to satisfy § 158(a)(5)’s collective-bargaining requirement, 
the employer and the employees’ representative must, inter alia, “confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”). 
359. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free 
Choice Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47, 56 (2009) (“Although . . . the NLRA imposes a duty to bargain 
in good faith, the United States Supreme Court long ago decided that the Board lacks the 
authority to force a recalcitrant—even an illegally recalcitrant—party to reach agreement.”). 
360. See id. at 64 (noting that mandatory arbitration of first collective-bargaining contracts aids 
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worksite level, and with entities that exercise financial power in a given industry 
or over a given supply chain, as well as with direct employers.361 For student 
debtors, for example, bargaining would be required with for-profit colleges with 
exploitative debt practices, lenders, and government regulators.362 And the top-
ics of bargaining would not be limited by law to exclude, for example, entrepre-
neurial issues or broader political concerns; instead, these conditions would be 
reworked to allow organizations to bargain expansively and for the “common 
good.” 
A related type of legal intervention would grant policymaking power to or-
ganizations of poor and working-class Americans through administrative pro-
cesses at the local, state, or federal levels of government.363 Beyond simply en-
couraging group participation, the law could give organizations the right to 
appoint representatives to public administrative bodies based on membership 
levels relative to the constituency as a whole. For example, housing law could 
require that housing authorities or rent-control boards add seats for each tenant 
union that meets a certain threshold number of members. The tenant union’s 
membership would then be entitled to elect a representative to the new seat. And 
labor law could require that workers’ compensation boards and occupational-
health boards include members from unions that reach a certain density. Federal, 
state, or local government could also facilitate sectoral and regional bargaining 
using a tripartite approach, enabling worker organizations and employer 
 
361. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 26, at 79 (advocating for “state-supported sectoral bargaining”); 
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and drawing lessons from a movement of debtors to for-profit colleges who organized and 
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organizations—or tenant organizations and landlord organizations, debtors and 
banks—to establish employment conditions—or housing or lending stand-
ards—jointly throughout a given sector, subject to governmental oversight as 
required by constitutional delegation and due-process doctrines.364 
Such administrative mechanisms would provide organizations concrete 
power in policymaking. To the extent the law conditioned participation on mem-
bership levels, it might also have the effect of encouraging organizations to es-
tablish federated membership structures in ways that enhance their long-term 
ability to exercise political power.365 Moreover, in providing meaningful interim 
victories, such processes could contribute to members’ sense of collective efficacy 
and thus to further organizing.366 
F. Contestation and Disruption 
Almost everyone agrees that when a political system offers a nondisruptive 
means for accomplishing change, such methods are preferable. In theory, the 
American pluralist system implies that everyone can engage through nondisrup-
tive means. But a substantial body of sociology work suggests that a degree of 
disruption is necessary for movement success, particularly among poor people. 
As William A. Gamson observes, “Unruly groups, those that use violence, 
strikes, and other constraints, have better than average success” at achieving the 
movement’s goals.367 Charles Tilly has reached similar conclusions, studying 
movement actions dating back to food riots in Burgundy, France in the seven-
teenth century. Tilly explains that repertoires of contention vary depending on 
legal and social context—ranging from tax revolts to strikes to mass public meet-
ings—but his study underlines the importance of contention over time and 
 
364. For discussions of contemporary and historical efforts at sectoral bargaining and the consti-
tutional constraints on such efforts, see Andrias, supra note 67, at 659-95, which discusses 
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across contexts.368 In work studying the Civil Rights movement, Doug McAdam 
similarly finds that movement success depended on disruptive tactics, though he 
finds that the most effective forms of disruption were temporary and involved 
constant innovation to respond to segregationist reprisals.369 
In perhaps the most famous study of poor people’s movements, Frances Fox 
Piven and Richard Cloward highlight how insurgent and defiant action is critical 
to movement success.370 Protest takes different forms depending on institutional 
context and the ways in which individuals can withhold cooperation or ser-
vices—workers can withhold labor, and tenants can withhold rent, whereas the 
unemployed must sometimes occupy workplaces and demonstrate en masse.371 
Protest is more likely to be effective if three conditions exist: (1) Protestors are 
central to institutions’ functioning; (2) Powerful groups have a stake in those 
institutions; and (3) Protesters are able to protect themselves from reprisal.372 
Research from historians and political scientists confirms the account offered 
in the sociological literature about the role of disruptive action in movement suc-
cess. From the early- and mid-twentieth-century industrial-worker strikes and 
rent strikes to the 1960s student movements and civil-rights protests and boy-
cotts, disruptive concerted action has been critical to movement success.373 Con-
temporary examples tell a similar story. In the spring of 2012, for example, hun-
dreds of thousands of students in Quebec protested a proposed seventy-five 
percent increase in tuition at public universities. Organized by their student un-
ions, over 300,000 students went on strike, with several hundred thousand 
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remaining on strike for months. By September, the government abandoned its 
proposed increase.374 In Los Angeles, in recent years, incidents of tenant rent 
strikes have increased in the face of rising rents and deplorable housing condi-
tions, with tenants, organized by the Los Angeles tenants’ union, winning some 
significant victories in both local policy and private rent arrangements.375 Mean-
while, in the last few years, hundreds of thousands of public-school teachers in 
the United States have engaged in mass strikes, winning substantial improve-
ments in salaries, benefits, and education funding even in states with Republican 
legislatures and no formal union rights.376 During the COVID-19 pandemic, 
strikes by essential workers at Amazon, Whole Foods, Target, FedEx, and else-
where, and protests by nurses and other healthcare workers, forced attention to 
urgent health and safety concerns.377 
Law can facilitate effective protest through several mechanisms. First, it can 
affirmatively provide the right to strike across domains. That is, law can and 
should explicitly grant the right of workers, tenants, and public beneficiaries to 
engage in concerted action, including protests and strikes. Simply creating a 
right is not enough, however. Second, law must also provide protection from 
both private and state reprisal—and protection must be meaningful and broad 
in scope. Thus, the law must not only prohibit employers from firing workers 
for striking (as private-sector labor law does, but much public-sector law does 
not); it also must prohibit permanent replacement of those who strike and 
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provide strong penalties and enforcement mechanisms. 378  Similarly, the law 
must prohibit tenants from being evicted or harassed and beneficiaries from be-
ing cut off or having their benefits reduced. 
Third, the law must protect the right to engage in effective concerted action, 
even when such action is disruptive. For example, the law should not only pro-
vide workers at a single employer the right to strike and to demonstrate peace-
fully in front of their employer, nor should it only provide tenants the right to 
protest their particular landlord. Rather, and in contrast to current labor law, the 
law could also offer some protection for secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes 
across multiple domains, and it could permit nontraditional strikes short of full 
or indefinite stoppages.379 To be sure, limits ought to exist on the right to engage 
in disruptive protest. Protests must be peaceful, eschewing both destruction of 
property and violence against individuals. But the right to protest becomes inef-
fective if it is cabined to prevent disruption. 
Finally, the law should protect protests and strikes that have the political pro-
cess as a target and the “common good” as a goal.380 Current labor law achieves 
this to a point: the Supreme Court has held that the NLRA protects workers’ 
concerted activity that occurs through political channels, but only insofar as the 
activity relates to employment issues. 381 The NLRB has also concluded that 
workers may not be protected if they strike for an exclusively political cause.382 
Despite these restrictions—and others present in public-sector labor law—work-
ers have frequently struck to advance the common good and to influence political 
decisionmaking. Consider the 2019 Chicago Teachers’ strike, during which 
teachers demanded not only better wages and benefits and smaller class sizes, 
but also housing assistance for new teachers, staff to help students and families 
in danger of losing housing, and other steps to advance affordable housing in 
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the city.383 A law designed to reduce political inequality would grant protection 
to this kind of collective action. 
For many, the preceding recommendations regarding strikes will be contro-
versial, if not entirely objectionable. In a liberal society, traditional paths of po-
litical power—voting, lobbying, participation—remain preferred. Our recom-
mendations aim to strengthen those channels and to make disruption and 
contestation less likely. But history and social-science research leaves little doubt 
that disruptive concerted action is also essential for working-class and poor peo-
ple to have a reasonable chance of success at achieving a redistribution in political 
(and economic) power.384 
conclusion 
Skeptics will object that none of this is possible. If elites wield so much power 
in the political sphere, why would they ever permit reforms that would 
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fundamentally weaken their power while strengthening countervailing 
forces?385 The point is well taken. Reforms suggested in this Article will be dif-
ficult to achieve, particularly at the national level in the short term. 
Yet the obstacles are not insurmountable. The power of the wealthy ebbs 
depending on circumstance and alignments, and several factors can enable eco-
nomically progressive legislative change. First, government tends to respond to 
the concerns of poor and working-class voters when those concerns become par-
ticularly salient. Second, divisions among elites can create openings for redis-
tributive reform, as can elite sympathy with the cause of less affluent fellow citi-
zens—or worry that failure to act will produce even more radical change.386 In 
addition, the federalized nature of our government creates openings for legisla-
tive change at the state and local level that can, in turn, increase the likelihood of 
reform at the national level.387 Crucially, moreover, the growth facilitated by 
supportive laws in one locality can enable federated organizations to export their 
power to other localities and ultimately to the national level.388 
There is reason to believe that several of these dynamics are present today. 
To state the obvious, the COVID-19 pandemic has made the economic plight of 
poor and working-class Americans highly politically salient. The resurgence of 
organizing among workers, tenants, and debtors that has occurred in response 
to the pandemic—and that has highlighted the inequities of how the pain of the 
pandemic is distributed—has only increased this salience, as have the extraordi-
nary protests organized by Movement for Black Lives. 389  Voters are clearly 
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concerned about these issues and increasingly support bold policy initiatives to 
address them. For example, a huge majority of voters now say they would prefer 
the federal government take “major, sweeping action”—rather than “modest ac-
tion”—to address the economic impact of the pandemic.390 There is also strong 
support for the proposition that “[t]he devastation triggered by coronavirus 
means we have to both address the immediate economic needs and work to fix 
problems in our economy—like inequality and poverty—that made us all more 
vulnerable.”391 
These trends extend political shifts that have been developing since the re-
cession of 2008. Thus, majorities in both red and blue states now express sup-
port for minimum wage increases and for labor unions.392 Elite opinion shows 
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similar changes: economists, once largely skeptical of both worker-organization 
and minimum-wage laws, are now increasingly expressing support. 393 From 
Medicare for All to a $15 minimum wage, from student-debt relief to fundamen-
tal labor-law reform, redistributive policies are being seriously discussed by na-
tional political leaders in a way they have not been for at least a generation.394 
This shi� in opinion is already reflected in policy changes in progressive state 
and local jurisdictions. In California, for example, the governor has extended 
union-negotiated terms to the entire grocery industry to ensure that safety and 
health standards reach all the grocery workers in the state.395 It is safe to say that 
such a move, with its suggestion of European-style tripartite sectoral bargaining, 
would have been unthinkable a short time ago. In fact, numerous progressive 
reforms—ranging from new rights for workers excluded from federal labor law 
to enhanced protections for tenants—have been enacted at the state and local 
level in jurisdictions with progressive majorities and active organizations among 
low- and middle-income residents.396 The extent to which experimentation at 
the local level is legally permissible will vary based on the organizing context. In 
some cases, like labor law, significant federal-preemption hurdles exist.397 In 
other areas, like tenant rights, preemption is not an obstacle. But in both con-
texts, and in others as well, some local and state experimentation is both possible 
and imperative, laying the groundwork for future federal reform. 
Of course, once legislative majorities exist, backlash is a concern, as is con-
servative judicial resistance. Particularly in recent years, where progressive local-
ities have engaged in innovative economic policymaking, conservative states 
have clamped down through aggressive preemption rules,398 and courts have a 
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long history of interpreting ambiguity in law against the interests of the poor 
and working class.399 To some extent, legislation can be designed with this his-
tory in mind—for example, through the inclusion of clear purpose statements, 
unambiguous text, and provisions that limit courts’ injunctive power. And with 
respect to political backlash, as E. E. Schattschneider famously argued, “New 
policies create a new politics.”400 That observation will have particular relevance 
in our context. A�er all, laws designed to enable organizing will be particularly 
effective at generating their own political durability precisely because they will—
explicitly and intentionally—build constituencies with the power to ensure the 
laws’ survival.401 
None of this is to suggest that enacting laws to facilitate organizing among 
the poor and middle class would be easy; none of it is to predict that such enact-
ment would be likely. Of course, the kinds of laws we propose here would face 
intense opposition. Those who currently wield unrivaled power will vigorously 
object to laws that enable their power to be countervailed. Those who have had 
disproportionate—sometimes unfettered—influence over our politics will object 
to the diminishment of that influence. But, in a democracy, these objections must 
be overcome. And that is exactly what the reforms we propose are meant to en-
able. 
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